Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-086 *2 May 1996*

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Albania: PS Deputy Views 'Very Successful' U.S. Visit

AU0205100696 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 1 May 96 pp 6, 13

[Article by Socialist Party Deputy Kastriot Islami: "Successful Visit of the Socialist Party to the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. The Socialist Party Delegation Visits the United States According to U.S. Practice

The Socialist Party [PS] paid a four-day visit to the United States. Its delegation included First Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi, Deputy Chairman Ilir Meta, and Deputies Kastriot Islami and Anastas Angjeli. Their program included a series of visits and meetings at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Senate, and with congressmen, politicians, and journalists interested in Albania and democratic developments here. A special news conference was held at the National Press Building.

The aim of the visit was twofold: first, to present the anxieties of the opposition over all the antidemocratic and anticonstitutional behavior of the ruling party, which has recently placed in doubt the normal conduct of fair and democratic elections; and second, to present to the U.S. Government the socialist options and alternatives for its future government.

The United States is of interest to Albania. Peace and tranquillity in the region are of particular importance to the United States. In this context, the U.S. Government is very interested that the forthcoming elections in Albania, as a touchstone of Albanian democracy, should be free, fair, and democratic. The U.S. Government is ready to recognize all alternatives and welcomes without any prejudice meetings with all Albanian political forces.

According to State Department practice, a political party pays visits and holds meetings following an invitation from a U.S. foundation or political party to the political party that is to be a guest. In this case, the PS received a formal invitation from the Mediterranean Quarterly cultural foundation, and the program of the visit was arranged by this foundation in communication with the State Department. The cultural foundation, which is headed by Mrs. Selwa Roosevelt, besides its research activities also publishes a magazine with articles analyzing important issues. This magazine has published articles coming from Albania, written by President Berisha's military adviser Adem Cobani and PS Deputy Anastas Angjeli. The PS has respected State Department practice and has not claimed in any of its reports that the formal invitation came directly from the State Department. The visit to the United States and the spirit of warmth and goodwill encountered at all the meetings were very important for the PS.

The Democratic Party [PD], extremely jealous of this visit and its success, has done its utmost to belittle it. However, its weapon was a very weak one: Was there an invitation or not? I learned from an earlier visit to the United States a very important principle of communicating with the media and the public: that of replying to the attacks of your opponent in an oblique and positive manner. Therefore, my answer is: The visit of the PS delegation to the United States was very successful. American hospitality was evident everywhere. A spirit of friendliness and understanding pervaded all our meetings. The PS, certain of its victory in the forthcoming elections, put forward its alternatives for government. The direct contacts between the PS and U.S. institutions finally destroyed the disinformation or distortions whose purpose had been to harm the party's image. The United States is ready to welcome all the viewpoints of democratic forces.

2. The PS's Anxieties: Free and Democratic Elections in Danger

The PS and all the opposition have long been worried by the authoritarian government of Berisha's regime, especially recently concerning the normal conduct of free, fair, and democratic elections in Albania. The authoritarian government of the PD with Berisha at its head has significantly lost support among the electorate. The encroachments on the independence of the judiciary, the total control over the media, the pressures on journalists and those who think differently, the obstruction of the legitimate activities of the opposition, and corruption at all levels explain the reaction of the majority of the population and their desire for change at all costs. The blows struck against the opposition, the use of violence to obstruct its activities, and the most flagrant act of detaining Socialist leader Fatos Nano as a political prisoner and hostage for three years have seriously compromised Berisha's government and regime. The referendum was a signal and an omen of his defeat in the forthcoming elections. However, Berisha does not seem very well prepared to agree to a surrender of power in a democratic manner. Although the PD and Berisha are aware of their imminent defeat, they have prepared to cushion it by passing three antidemocratic and anticonstitutional laws and by setting in motion all the machinery of the state. Berisha's aim is to shape a new opposition with new people who will not amount to more than two-thirds of the number of deputies in the next parliament.

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However, the PS and the opposition are prepared to use all their democratic leeway not to fall prey to provocations and to defend every vote in their favor. The PS and the opposition are certain of a victory with a more than two-thirds majority and warn the electorate and the public abroad that the PD and Berisha, the chairman of the PD's campaign, will be responsible for any manipulation or any incident during the elections.

a. The Antigenocide Law: A Law To Eliminate Political Opponents and Opposition Intellectuals

There was no genocide in Albania, and it seems that you Albanians are not very clear about the meaning of this term. Under a communist system, it is natural that there should have been crimes against humanity, but not genocide. The judgment of these individual crimes according to the law must pave the way for conciliation. Cooperation is very important for the construction of democracy.

The PS has stated very clearly its view that crimes against humanity were committed during the communist period, but they must be judged individually and according to the Penal Code. No collective punishment is admissible if a democratic state claims to be creating the rule of law. Collective punishments en bloc were a leading characteristic of the Stalinist system. The Antigenocide Law is such a law. Moreover, conviction under this law also violates one of the basic constitutional laws, also covered by all the international charters on human rights and freedoms: the right to be elected. No democratic country violates this right. Albania is the only country in the world that prevents by law its own citizens from being elected. The claim that the Czech Republic has acted in the same way is not true because the law there prevents a certain category of people from being appointed. Appointments and elections are two different categories of human rights. Moreover, this law does not in reality stand in the way of any leader of the old guard, but only intellectuals and opponents of Berisha who committed themselves to politics after the legal introduction of pluralism in Albania. This law was approved only by the deputies of the PD majority and was opposed by the entire opposition. The Constitutional Court, faced with a dilemma, admitted that Article 3 of this law is legally anticonstitutional, but morally necessary. As a result, the Constitutional Court put itself in the position of a political body like the Politburo at the beck and call of the ruling party.

b. The Law on Screening Official Figures: A Law for Politically Manipulating the Files

It has often been said in the Albanian press that Berisha controlled the previous parliament in two ways: the files of the Sigurimi agents, and corruption. Nevertheless, a dubiously clean parliament took it upon itself to decide on the moral cleanliness of the next parliament. The PS has come out clearly in favor of cleansing Albanian political life but has demanded that this should be done by means of a democratic law that will not affect the universal right to be elected and human rights and freedoms. The Law on Screening Official Figures does not at all aim to cleanse political life, but to control all the opposition's candidates in the next elections. What was called the government commission, which was not in the least pluralist and was entirely in the hands of the PD and Berisha, turned itself into a special court which moreover was totally unaccountable for the decisions it issued. This phantom commission was a mere mouthpiece of Berisha's political decisions on the basis of memorandums from Zhulali, Gazidede, Musaraj, and Shehu. This law too was carried only by the irresponsible but extremely intimidated and frightened majority in the last parliament. The Constitutional Court found itself in a position that must be unique in the history of world jurisprudence. The court neither made a decision to reject the opposition's demand to call the Law on Screening Official Figures unconstitutional, but nor did it annul this law. In other words, the court made a decision that it was not able to make a decision. It had only one way out, to tender its resignation. However, Berisha's Politburo does not recognize the institution of resignation. As a result, Berisha is aiming to use this law to politically play with the files, not opening them properly, but striking at the opposition by calling its members incriminated and implicated in the activities of the former State Security Service. When it comes to power, the PS will expand this law and will open the files of all public figures in the last parliament and those who will be elected on 26 May. The PS will also expose how the files have been doctored with parts crossed out in ink or excised with razor blades, and also how files have disappeared. The files will be opened by a pluralist commission, and the people will judge who was and is incriminated by collaboration with the State Security Service.

c. The New Electoral Law: A Legislative Attempt To Rig a Free Ballot

The main anticonstitutional elements of the new Electoral Law involve the distribution of the constituencies, which our press has called the Salimander effect, and the procedure of the administration of the voting. The distribution of the constituencies by Berisha's decree is anticonstitutional because the matter is left in the hands of the president and it is illegal because constituencies differ in size by up to 12,000 voters, although the average number of voters in each constituency is 18,000.

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The commissions have been constructed in such a manner as to ensure that the PD always dominates the presidiums of the commissions.

The Central Electoral Commission approved by Berisha has four members from the opposition compared to nine members from the PD and four from its satellites. The decisions of this commission are always made in the most high-handed fashion and by order from above, without allowing any discussion. The law also favors the PD's access to the media at a time when Berisha and the PD government are misusing the media from their positions of power. In an entirely anticonstitutional manner, Berisha has installed himself not only as the PD's campaign leader but as a candidate at the head of the PD's list of candidates for proportional representation. This law tends more toward unfree and undemocratic elections. The opposition, in an utterly disadvantaged position, finds little democratic elbowroom for winning the election and avoiding the PD's provocations. The government is also unable to meet on time all the deadlines envisaged by this law.

3. The PS's Options and Alternatives for Government

The PS is a new party, clearly dissociated from the past, from communism, from totalitarianism, and from the structures and practices of the party-state. The PS is a totally reformed party with a left-wing social-democratic orientation. It has experience as a constructive opposition and is able to secure mass support and govern the country. The PS has relations of cooperation with other parties in the Albanian political spectrum and with a large number of parties and international organizations of left-wing parties in Europe. The PS is against political revenge, and aims to end imprisonment for political reasons for the first time in the history of Albania and to respect all institutions. The PS is a party with internal democracy in which different personalities determine the spirit of debate and ensure a dynamic unity.

The PS bases its activities on the defense and consolidation of political pluralism, the rule of law, the development of the market economy, the defense of human rights and freedoms, the social protection of marginalized social strata, on the achievement of higher standards of living for our own citizens, and on a realistic judgment of the values and evils of the past. The PS does not aim to change the course of government but to improve and correct it.

The PS has always supported the radical transformation of the Albanian economy from a command economy to a social market economy. The PS considers that the economic reforms should give priority to private property in economic life. The PS sees private property as sacred and supports its defense. The PS has always declared itself in favor of legitimate, open, and noncorrupt privatization in all sectors of the economy, by all possible means. The PS is in favor of a modern banking system in which new banks will play the primary role. The PS has always been in favor of closer relations with and greater support from international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc., and sees all adaptations and controls of the economy from this angle.

The PS appreciates the special importance of relations with the United States, and is committed to further intensifying these relations in all fields of mutual interest, and especially in political, economic, and military areas. The PS will continue to effectively implement the agreements that have been reached so far and will further expand on them.

The PS supports the establishment of relations with other states in the region on the principle of good-neighborliness. The PS holds fast to the view that, in order to be fully integrated in European and Atlantic structures and the EU, Albania must begin with good-neighborliness and cooperation with such adjacent EU members as Greece and Italy. The PS aims to take an active initiative in diplomatic efforts to reestablish peace and stability in the region. The PS is committed to continually working for the free movement of people, ideas, and goods, and for a Europeanized Balkans.

The PS has consistently supported the fuller inclusion of the minorities and especially the Greek minority in the country's cultural and economic life. The PS considers the minorities as bridges to our neighbors, and wishes to see this vision made a reality. The PS has continually come out in favor of fulfilling demands for minority rights, and especially Greek rights, in accordance with international charters and conventions.

The PS cannot reconcile itself to the present treatment of the Albanians of Kosova. The PS considers the Dayton agreement to be a step toward peace and tranquillity in the region. The PS bases this solution on not changing borders by violence and on initiating dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party.

4. Messages From Meetings in the United States

Mr. Richard Schifter, President Clinton's special assistant and an adviser on the National Security Council, said after listening to the presentation by the leader of the PS delegation that the United States is open to all alternatives and does not prejudge any of them. The United States is very interested in the establishment of peace and stability in the region. Democracy must also

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be fully established in Albania, because peace in the region is also a function of this democracy. The Unites States is working to see that developments proceed in all the former communist countries as they do in the Western democracies.

Maryland Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, who is very well aware of the situation in Albania, said at a meeting: I am very interested in Albania and have followed developments in your country. I have insisted that the elections in Albania must be free and democratic because democracy is a very long process. The United States supports those forces that will win through free and democratic elections.

At the State Department, the first meeting was with James Swiggert, who expressed the readiness of the State Department to welcome and recognize all kinds of political viewpoints: We consider Albania to be a friendly country, regardless of which party wins the elections. The State Department has always worked to support the conduct of free and democratic elections. All political forces in Albania must cooperate among themselves to establish democracy, because the road toward a consolidated democracy is long and democracy cannot be imported.

At another meeting at the State Department with Messrs. Steve Coffey, James Bigus, and Stanley Miles, members of the staff of Assistant Secretary of State Timothy Wirth, we received the following message: Free and democratic elections are of primary importance for your country. The process of the elections must include no elements of violence, and all groups must ensure the peaceful and normal conduct of the elections.

Albania: Expiration Date of Privatization Bonds Extended

AU0105122296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 1 May 96 p 15

[Article by Milto Baka: Halt to Mass Privatization—Expiry Date of Bonds Extended]

[FBIS Translated Text] In March 1992, the solemn promise was made that everyone was to have a share in ownership. The 1996 campaign has begun with the same promise. The government distributed bonds, but the value of these bonds sank 10-14 percent of their face value with the inscription: Valid until June 1996. Thousands of citizens have still not become owners of bonds in the first phase, thanks to irregularities in distribution and declining public interest. The street market turned over the majority of privatization bonds at laughable prices. The government promised that this is only the beginning; the creation of a stock exchange will change the situation. The government advanced the theory that the stock exchange will soon be conceived as a market bringing together supply and demand for government bonds, privatization bonds, and the shares of companies that will be listed on the exchange. Citizens' hopes were again raised. However, the creation of a stock exchange was postponed and the government yesterday decided that the second phase of mass privatization through bonds will begin on 1 July 1996, while the first phase has been extended until October 1996. Citizens are still waiting. They toiled for 30-40 years and earned 2,000 leks and some privatization bonds that they are keeping as relics of dreams that never came true. The strategy of mass privatization has worn itself out. The Council of Ministers decided yesterday that the period of validity of privatization bonds will be extended until the end of October 1996. What else can it do when privatization has become so extremely politicized and the organizations carrying it out do not know what else to do?

The Government Directed Privatization Without Control

Another motto of the Meksi government was privatize everything. So far, 83 former state enterprises have been privatized in packages. Months passed, and the privatized enterprises did not start work. It was obvious that their owners had changed and the government had gotten rid of them. The stockholders waited anxiously. Who would help them to ensure that what they had gathered in their hands would not go down the drain? The government insisted that the stockholders should put the enterprises back to work themselves, but forgot that they were reduced to a desperate plight and that any beginning without the help of credit would be extremely difficult.

The government's most recent decision states that because the distribution of privatization bonds in the first phase was a protracted procedure, it is necessary to postpone the second phase. The government is very backwards here, when people have been wondering for two years what has been happening to the national assets and have been seeing them distributed unfairly, as far as the majority of the population is concerned. Wheeler-dealers and those who have enriched themselves through corruption have been buying privatization bonds and subsequently enterprises and assets at knockdown prices. It was first thought that privatization would proceed at a regular pace, but now phases have been introduced.

Political Campaigns Interrupt the Process

Yesterday's government decision states that the beginning of the second phase involves the Bank of Albania

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issuing privatization bonds in denominations of 20,000 and 40,000 leks with an expiry date of 31 December 1999. Why this pause, when dozens and hundreds of specialists have been involved in this process centrally and at the grass roots? The reason lies in the political campaign. For the sake of the campaign, an entire strategy has been sacrificed, affecting the rate of the reform and the fate of poverty-stricken individuals who again place their hopes in these relics of bonds.

If parliament has approved genuinely democratic legislation for privatization, let the parties conduct their campaigns. People are asking for what belongs to them. It is the government itself that is obstructing the pace of privatization.

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Bulgaria: Pavlov Discusses Balkan Military Cooperation

AU0105160596 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 29 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov by Dusan Drazic, TANJUG correspondent in Sofia; place and date not given: "We Believe Much More in Security Reached Through Dialogue and Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Drazic] The military part of the Dayton agreement is being implemented along general lines, which is important for regional stability and security. The civil war in Bosnia is behind us, but, nevertheless, in Tirana you proposed a conference of Balkan defense ministers, the United States, Russia, the EU, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other organizations interested in attaining regional security. What are the basic goals of your proposal to conduct the defense ministers conference in Sofia, and what can be expected from the meeting?

[Pavlov] I would like to take this opportunity to once again express Bulgaria's satisfaction with the signing and successful implementation of the agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the military part. However, the regional security problems were not eliminated by ending the "hot phase" of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. I think that the Paris peace treaty on Bosnia-Herzegovina is only a good beginning in this respect, which must be supported and adequately continued.

According to a Bulgarian proverb, one must strike while the iron is hot. I am sure that the other Balkan nations have similar proverbs. It means that something that has been initiated and started must be completed without delay. This is what prompted our country to propose a meeting of Balkan defense ministers in Tirana. [passage omitted]

[Drazic] Several weeks have passed since you announced your proposal. What was the reaction of the Balkan countries, and are you optimistic about organizing the meeting?

[Pavlov] The favorable reactions to our initiative are increasing, which allows me to view the meeting optimistically. I should point out that Bulgaria is not seeking any sensational goals in organizing this meeting. On the contrary, we would like to see such meetings become routine and that they be used to express sincere desires toward contributing the most to asserting regional security. [passage omitted]

[Drazic] At the beginning of April, the world and especially the Balkans were surprised by the U.S. strategy launched in Tirana regarding the construction of a defensive line between the southern part of the Balkans and the rest of the peninsula. How do your ministry and government view the construction of axes, lines, and groups under the patronage of this or that organization, especially against the background of the recent Romanian proposal regarding a new union of certain states of the former East Bloc?

[Pavlov] First, I must say something about Bulgaria's decision to participate in the Tirana meeting. I am sure that none of the participants would answer affirmatively to a question on whether a U.S. initiative on constructing a "defensive line" across the Balkans has been launched in Tirana. By restoring the bloc manner of thinking—in whatever form—we would return to a past epoch, an epoch of formal security, which did not bring us any prosperity, democracy, and human rights.

Naturally, every state can resolve its security problems in its own way, providing it does not affect the security of other countries. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, we adhere to only one "axis"—the one that most directly links the Balkans to Europe. [passage omitted]

[Drazic] Will the Sofia meeting also discuss NATO expansion, other alliances, and the arms imbalance in the Balkans during a period when rearming continues in Bosnia? Could this jeopardize the efforts of the Balkan states to guarantee regional security?

[Pavlov] Naturally, at this stage, we still do not have an agenda for the meeting. The discussion of certain issues will depend on the participants. It is our view that we must first seek a common denominator of security interests. This could unite us and bring us to establish specific steps. If I had to improvise, I would say that we should think about expanding the bilateral agreements on confidence and security-building measures, and possibly turning them into a regional system. The Balkans could make a serious step towards Europe.

Unfortunately, I share your opinion that we indeed could talk about a new wave of Balkan militarization. The necessary political realism requires us to establish the real facts and problems and seek ways of most prudently resolving them. Therefore, it will be necessary to conduct many meetings and debates, but we will be satisfied even if only the beginning is marked in Sofia. We believe that more arms have never contributed and will never contribute to the security in the region and each state. We believe much more in security reached through dialogue and cooperation.

[Drazic] Does Yugoslavia support your initiative on organizing a meeting of Balkan defense ministers? How

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is the recent agreement on cooperation between the two Ministries of Defense and armies that was recently signed in Sofia being implemented?

[Pavlov] It is my opinion that there is nothing hindering the FRY from participating in the meeting. It could make a very serious contribution, especially regarding the rapid stabilization of the situation around Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, if TANJUG wants the most precise and thorough answer to your question, you should ask the FRY leadership.

I see the rapid pace with which we began to implement the bilateral agreement in military cooperation, our joint work on expanding the legal basis of bilateral cooperation, and most of all, the broad coincidence in the opinions on the basic problems of regional security and the way of resolving them as evidence of the FRY leadership's good intentions and concern. We established this in February 1996 during the visit of my colleague Pavle Bulatovic in Bulgaria.

I would like to take this opportunity to again express my conviction that Bulgarian-Yugoslav military relations will continue to develop in the interest of our neighbors and the other Balkan peoples and states.

Bulgaria: Reasons for Videnov's Visit to Vienna Assessed

AU0205124596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 10

[Commentary by Lili Popova, 24 CHASA correspondent in Vienna: "Zhan Videnov Went to Austria To Deny Our Pro-Russian Deviations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zhan Videnov attempted to accomplish two things during his important meetings and lectures in Vienna: First, he stated clearly that Bulgaria has a pro-European orientation, and second, he publicized our country as a promising field for foreign investments. [passage omitted]

While great interest was shown in all the events of the visit, the main question that the prime minister was asked was how precisely does Bulgaria keep compatible its application to join the EU and NATO and its close relations with Russia. Heinz Fischer, president of the Austrian Parliament, put this question to him directly. "A state like Bulgaria will not respond in any way to invitations to join USSR-2," the prime minister retorted.

The Austrian journalists and the audience at Videnov's lectures also inevitably raised the same issue, and Zhan Videnov invariably explained that there is a complete and unalterable consensus in Bulgaria on the question of us joining the EU, and that in our country no dilemma exists on whether to join alliances of some other form. Videnov hopes that direct negotiations on becoming a full EU member will begin at the intergovernmental conference of the EU member countries in 1998. Our prime minister admits the possibility that some of the former Soviet states may cut themselves off from integration with Europe, thus creating a new division of the Old Continent.

However, Prime Minister Videnov was not so categorical regarding Bulgaria's desire to join NATO, in contrast to its wish to join the EU. He did not fail to point out that our entry into NATO in the event of a possible expansion of the alliance can only happen in conformance with our national interests and when a new security architecture is in place in Europe. According to Videnov, in the future NATO should evolve into an organization with functions similar to those exercised by the United Nations following World War II.

In Videnov's view, the Bulgarian opposition regards the EU and NATO as two sides of the same coin. However, he said, the government discerns nuances between the two, all the more so because Bulgaria sees no danger from the East and therefore does not regard it as absolutely essential to join a military bloc.

In the prime minister's opinion, organized crime presents a much greater threat to the state. "The main factors governing crime in Bulgaria are economic ones. Bulgaria was subjected to immense pressure during the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which created conditions for a rise in the crime rate. Now that the conflict has been resolved, I hope to come to grips with crime," the prime minister explained.

Apart from creating an image for himself as a young, intelligent statesman-politician with modern thinking, Zhan Videnov brought back nothing concrete from Vienna. The seeds that he sowed will probably sprout in the future during Franz Vranitzky's official visit to Sofia in the coming months.

Videnov failed to persuade Austria to abolish the visa restrictions for Bulgarians. However, Chancellor Vranitzky promised that experts of the two countries would consider how to make it easier for Bulgarians to travel to Vienna. Both the chancellor and the president said that Austria is prepared to offer us its know-how, as one of the most recent countries accepted into the EU, and to assist us in joining the EU as soon as possible. Videnov and Vranitzky reached an understanding that Bulgaria and Austria should develop a system for financing export deals. "The credits will be granted by Austrian banks, but they will have to be guaranteed by our banks," explained Vladimir Zheglov, the prime minister's economic adviser.

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Dr. Vranitzky declared that Austria is interested in investing in Bulgaria. Vienna is reportedly showing a very strong desire to invest in our transport infrastructure. Federal President Thomas Klestil announced that Vienna is ready to form joint enterprises in Bulgaria. Austria has created 12,000 joint companies in neighboring countries. "This process should be extended beyond the territories of our geographical neighbors," Dr. Klestil believes. The thesis that "Bulgaria will become even more attractive for foreign investments" was the leitmotif of Videnov's lecture at the Austrian Economic Chamber. [passage omitted]

While in Austria, Videnov promised that Bulgaria will conclude standby agreements with the IMF and the World Bank before the end of the summer.

Videnov did not miss the opportunity to make another jibe at the president during his lecture at the Austrian Economic Chamber. He promised that the government and parliament would guarantee that the economic laws will be applied, despite the fact that Dr. Zhelev often tries to delay them.

Bulgaria: Commentary Sees Videnov 'Losing His Nerve'

AU0205085596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 6

[Commentary by Valentin Stoyanov: "Party Character (Partiynost)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It appears that there indeed is a change in the Bulgarian political reality—the strong ones who have the executive power in their hands, i.e. the cabinet and the parliamentary majority—appear to be losing their nerve, while the weaker—the opposition and its president—appear to have found a way of controlling theirs. This became obvious yesterday, when, at two celebrations that were different, but equally close to the Bulgarian people—the April 1876 Insurrection anniversary and 1 May—the two, let us call them opposing factors, used two different approaches.

In his speech in Koprivshtitsa, Zhelev finally used a statesmanlike all-nation approach, while, at the celebration in Sofia, Videnov addressed the participants mostly from a party position. Indeed, this is how their arguments sounded. Actually, both Bulgarian celebrations were used for purely electoral and party goals.

The logical question is of how efficient all this is. Zhelev undoubtedly helped himself. Videnov added another negative point to the many such points he has accumulated recently.

Videnov is losing his nerve, and that is hardly a mystery—neither his party and governmental policies or not following his script. The prudent politician knows how to keep the state and party territories apart, regardless of how difficult the situation becomes. Everything else is a demagogic, narrow-party interest approach, something that a prime minister cannot afford, even if he is very young.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Seen as Possible Prime Minister

AU0205091396 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Reni Neshkova: "Will Pirinski Head a 'Berov-Type' Cabinet?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One can now sense even more clearly that the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] strategists are planning a "Berov-type" cabinet. [Professor Lyuben Berov headed an expert cabinet in 1993-94 that was under a strong BSP influence] It appears that the formula they prefer—"Rule, but make it look as though it were not so"—will be applied very soon.

The signs are evident, and the much publicized and officially reported war between the two strong wings in the BSP—the Lukanov-Lilov faction and Videnov's people—is especially indicative. One would hardly believe that Lukanov's statements against the "circle of friends" around Videnov are the result of a spontaneous dissatisfaction or that Stefan Prodev [DUMA chief editor] would allow the newspaper's pages to be used for an offensive against the prime minister without first ensuring solid support.

The real goal of the "perestroyka supporters," who ostensibly are dissatisfied with the government, is to save the BSP from a total failure, preserve its image as "the party of the competent ones," and let separate ministries be blamed for mistakes. This was envisaged after the December 1994 election victory.

The expelled leader of the Civil Alliance for the Republic, Aleksandur Tomov, would have hardly said in such a convincing manner that if the cabinet did not improve its work within 30 days, it would be necessary to think about forming a government of national consensus. He did not specify with whom a consensus would be sought, but one can figure it out.

The statements regarding nominating Georgi Pirinski as a presidential candidate of the leftist forces, which could be interpreted in various ways, could also be seen as promoting him as the future prime minister of a consensus government. It appears that Pirinski's words to the fact that the controversy in the country must be eliminated in a lasting manner in favor of a

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"broad national consensus," his high rating among the Socialists, and the support he is receiving from the Bulgarian Business Bloc and the "nonparty experts," will be used as a saving formula against the anticipation, also on the part of the BSP strategists, of a total failure on the part of the BSP to rule without CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.

Bulgaria: Dogan Against Working With SDS in Kurdzhali

AU0205091196 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 4

[Interview with DPS leader Ahmed Dogan by Nina Stefanova; place and date not given: "DPS Will Struggle for Power After the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stefanova] Mr. Dogan, have you participated in a deal regarding Kurdzhali's mayorship?

[Dogan] The Kurdzhali Okrug Court turned out to be a provincial court, while the Supreme Court really proved to be a supreme court. It is natural for the other side to suspect that there was a manipulation, but there was none.

[Stefanova] Ivan Kostov [leader of Union of Democratic Forces, SDS], said that the blue [SDS] door will be open for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] only until 1 June, and if the SDS is betrayed, the door will be closed forever. Will the DPS revise its formula on "voting according to conscience"?

[Dogan] The DPS does not depend on any organization or coalition. Many conditions were posed to us in the last six years. We respect those who respect us. We will allow our voters to vote according to their conscience.

[Stefanova] Nevertheless, would you support one of the opposition candidates?

[Dogan] We are in a delicate situation. If we support one of the candidates, then there will certainly be no need for primaries. Our Central Council will decide on this matter on 11 May. We will issue a general decision and will let the local organizations make their choice. However, the DPS support for one of the two candidates is possible. We will do everything possible to prompt our people to participate actively in the primaries. However, there probably will be a new division of the polling stations.

[Stefanova] Why didn't you meet Ivan Kostov in Kurdzhali?

[Dogan] A meeting was possible, but I was hindered. This is not an indication of my attitude to the SDS. However, I would like to point out that we do not have a united opposition, and this is a fact. The agreement did not create a united opposition, but only specified the election rules.

[Stefanova] Will the DPS participate in a campaign aimed at prompting early parliamentary elections?

[Dogan] The DPS is one of the initiators of such a campaign. We will do everything possible to win the presidential elections, and afterward—to topple the government. However, we would not like the cabinet to fall before the autumn. We would like their voters to understand that their government model and program are a lost cause and a wasted opportunity. Let Videnov use his own hands to pull his chestnuts out of the fire. Afterward, our goal will be to participate in the government as a part of the democratic forces' parliamentary majority. We harbor no illusions on this matter—we must participate by all means in the government. A party that does not pursue this goal is an association or a club for exchanging pleasant thoughts before going to bed. The important thing is to get access to the levers of power.

[Stefanova] Will the Kurdzhali coalition include different parties?

[Dogan] The political forces that supported us during the elections will be our partners in governing the region, but this will hardly be the SDS. We did not get enough support from the SDS during the Kurdzhali elections.

Bulgaria: Editorial Sees Primaries as U.S. 'Experiments'

AU0205094996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Milena Nikolova: "1 June—Children's Holiday of Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria will probably again become a unique state—we are the only state in Europe that will have internal party primaries, characteristic only of the United States. No civilized state in western Europe or among the leading eastern European states allows such a waste of time and energy. It is still unclear for what purpose and for what candidate the funds allocated by the foundations will be used. It is clear, however, that a part of the Bulgarian political space will be used for implanting the leading U.S. experience. The difference is only in the minor detail that Bulgaria, with its territory and population, could measure up to only one of the U.S. states.

Recently, the female head of a U.S. department stressed the similarities between Bulgaria and her state, which was only an uncivilized Indian territory until 1907.

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Apparently, the initiators of the so-called primaries see our motherland as an experimental territory onto which they could stick all kinds of U.S. grafts. In the particular case we are discussing—the primaries of the so-called united opposition—the basic part of the funds comes from those who want to conduct the experiments and, simultaneously, dictate the rules of the game.

The idea was indicated to the Union of Democratic Forces, which hastened to embrace it cordially and warmly. Since then, the dilemma of the so-called united opposition is to decide who is a friend and who an enemy. It subsequently focused on the attitude to the primaries and determined that all those who support the primaries are friends, and enemies—are all those who oppose them. Thus, Zhelev, misled by his advisers, found himself in the hole that people like Kosyo Mishev and Filip Dimitrov had dug for him. Now the participants in the upcoming show that is scheduled to take place in an almost anecdotal way on 1 June—International Children's Day—are again at the stage of beginning a routine scuffle. It is already clear to all there will most likely be primaries in Bulgaria. This is the order that came from across the ocean, something reflected in the frequent visits of various popular persons during the tenure of Filip Dimitrov. It suffices to note the intensified activity of Kosyo M. or any other well-known member of a certain "circle," or the activity of Lyubomir P. who is always wherever he smells a lot of money for propaganda and political shows.

Zhelev must have sensed the fruitlessness of the upcoming event. The SDS has put on a new face and claims that Petur Stoyanov [SDS presidential candidate] is the universal bright future. "The face" also believed this claim and has recently been enchanted with himself whenever he opened his mouth and tends to speak endlessly, until he foams at the mouth.

Actually, whose interests are the foreign sponsors serving?

Petur Stoyanov's interests? Hardly. He is a rather plain face, unknown as a politician, and unpredictable as a future statesman.

Perhaps the loyal Zhelev is nevertheless the better card? He repeatedly swears his allegiance to the Francophone culture and, simultaneously, does not miss an opportunity to obediently express love and gratitude for the big new white brother.

We will see what will happen on 1 June—International Children's Day. This day will also be the day of the opposition's infancy, because it still is trying to find its way.

Bulgaria: SDS Leader Kostov Comments on Primaries

AU2504112296 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 25 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sofia, Pleven (DEMOKRATSIYA)—I have faith in the good intentions of the politicians who signed the agreement on the presidential primaries, Ivan Kostov said yesterday in response to Zhelyu Zhelev's allegations that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] is not conducting a tolerant election campaign. The SDS leader said that he senses tension between the two opposition candidates because they avoid contact with one another. He again urged Petur Stoyanov and Zhelyu Zhelev to hold a public debate. If Zhelev refuses, the SDS chairman will seek a meeting of the leaders of the three formations that signed the agreement to discuss the opposition's future. We do not speak against Zhelev, but campaign for Petur Stoyanov because we are SDS men, he stressed.

We have no grounds to suspect that the dissatisfaction expressed by Dr. Zhelev will sabotage the agreement on electing a single opposition candidate, the SDS leader said later in Pleven. Talks were held today on organizing polling stations for the primaries, he said, and, in my view, this is the reason for the nervousness that has been created; this is a familiar and typical ploy used by the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] during negotiations, Kostov added. The SDS parliamentary group has adopted no resolution ordering the deputies to boycott Zhelev's election, he said, adding that the deputies will vote according to their consciences. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: SDS Leader on Monarchy, Scandals in BSP

AU2604090596 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 26 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Mariela Baleva: "Ivan Kostov: People's Union Statement Is a Mature Political Thesis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vratsa—I am pleased with the statement issued by the People's Union, which has declared on its own initiative that the formation of a second opposition center is unacceptable, Ivan Kostov said yesterday at a meeting with local SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] supporters in this town.

Meeting journalists, the SDS leader stressed that only understanding between all the opposition forces can lead the country toward a brighter future. Dr. Zhelev's new attitude to Simeon II is a 180-degree turnaround that marks new progress and creates a new situation

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involving the relations of all the democratic forces. According to Zhelev, His Royal Highness is coming to Bulgaria with good intentions, and his visit cannot affect the presidential primaries in any way. Kostov noted that Petur Stoyanov is the stronger candidate in that he offers something new. In Kostov's opinion, the electors will vote for dynamic change, not for the status quo.

Kostov also commented on the first very serious scandal, representing a direct defeat for Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, namely Granitski's retention of his job as television chief. For the first time, Kostov noted, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Parliamentary Group had opposed the prime minister. Ivan Kostov is convinced that the battle against Videnov is now beginning. He quoted Yuriy Borisov, who said that if the opposition were to seek a no confidence vote now Videnov might not be able to save his skin. In Kostov's view, the problem with the BSP is that it has no unifying figure.

We need the presidential elections now, and Petur Stoyanov's candidature is the best one for Bulgaria, said Ivan Stanchev, a National Assembly deputy from Vratsa region.

Bulgaria: First Reactor Expected To Remain in Use

AU0205083296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 May 96 p 8

[Staff report: "Shutting Down First Reactor Will Cost $5 Million"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rumen Ovcharov, first deputy chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, said that stopping the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant first reactor will cost Bulgaria $5 million.

The reactor was supposed to work around the clock for 250 days, and this period expires at the beginning of July. On 15 May, the reactor will be shut down so the metal of its construction can be tested, not for any technical reason. Prior to that a technical memorandum will be signed with the European Commission. Some ECU 7 million are expected from the PHARE [Economic and Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] Program because the reactor is being shut down ahead of schedule. The EU has already promised $500,000 for the upcoming tests. These will show whether it still is possible to use Kozloduy's oldest reactor.

According to Rumen Ovcharov, the problem is in the fact that the 440-megawatt reactor will be shut down before the entire quantity of nuclear fuel has been used, something that will require additional tests and expenditures.

Mr. Ovcharov stressed that we will have to replace the power produced by the first reactor with more expensive power produced by the Varna and Ruse Thermoelectric Power Plants.

By July at the latest, the U.S. company Westinghouse will take 6 samples of the metal in the construction of the first reactor. The tests will be conducted by the German company Siemens, Russian experts from Gidropres, and Bulgarian experts.

Despite the pressure to shut the reactor down for good, it is expected that it will continue to operate during the next heating season.

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Czech Republic: European Commission Questionnaire Received

AU0205121296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "(mkl, mcm)": "Zieleniec Has Taken Possession of the Long-Awaited Questionnaire"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—After several weeks of delays on the part of the European Commission, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec yesterday took possession of the 200-page questionnaire that should provide the European Union with detailed information on the state of our legislation, economy, monetary policy, and other spheres.

In an accompanying letter, the commission asks the Czech side to reply to all of the questions within three months. The European Commission will later draft an expert opinion based on the information that the appropriate authorities include in the questionnaire; this will form the basis for the negotiations on the Czech Republic's membership in the Union. The nine other countries that are interested in membership in the European Union have received an identical questionnaire.

"This is an important document because its processing is a condition for commencing the process of negotiations on the Czech Republic's entry into the European Union," said Zieleniec after he received the questionnaire from Joannes ter Haar, the European Commission's ambassador and the head of its delegation. He added that, in his opinion, the state apparatus will have no major problems with filling out the questionnaire, which he received in English in five copies.

The somewhat neglected agriculture in the Czech lands and the government subsidies that flow into it arouses most interest among the authors of the document. [passage omitted] In the transportation sphere, Brussels is interested in whether the management of the railroads is independent of the government.

The European commissioners, however, are also interested in the standard of protection for the rights of employees and consumers, copyright protection, and the standard of environmental protection. [passage omitted] Brussels also devotes a great deal of attention to transportation, the rules of the internal market, social issues, and the employment of foreign workers. The European Commission asks about the state of telecommunications and the situation in science and research. "How many computers per 100 citizens? How long is it necessary to wait for the installation of a telephone? If there is a brain drain in your country, what are the government's chances of dealing with it?"

Many of the questions deal with the state's policy in health care. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Electoral Body Decides on SD-LSNS Coalition Status

AU0205091696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 29 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "(ajk, kdr)": "The Electoral Commission Has Decided that the SD-LSNS Is a Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—The Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] will have to win 2 percent—that is, roughly 100,000 votes—more than its rivals in the elections to get into parliament. Namely, the Central Electoral Commission decided on 27 April that the SD-LSNS is an election coalition—the only one of the 16 entities campaigning—because, apart from its own members, it includes representatives of the Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers on its lists of candidates.

While parties or movements only have to cross the 5-percent threshold, a coalition has to win 7 percent of the vote.

The Electoral Commission's verdict has thus reduced even further the SD-LSNS's slim chance of success in the elections. According to the most recent public opinion polls, the SD-LSNS's popularity does not even reach 3 percent. [passage omitted]

One of the SD-LSNS's chairmen, Jiri Dienstbier, harshly condemned the commission's decision. "It is an interpretation made after the fact; it is discrimination. It is a shameful attempt by some parties to exclude one of the participants from the campaign. It is like when Meciar tried to exclude the Democratic Union," proclaimed Dienstbier. He added that the commission has already approved his party's list of candidates, the SD-LSNS has paid its deposit, and its ballot papers are to be printed.

The Central Electoral Commission's registrar, Vaclav Henych, said that the commission, in which all of the campaigning parties are represented, relied exclusively on the statements made in the mass media by the leading representatives of the SD-LSNS and the Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers when it made its decision. [passage omitted] The most weighty report, that the entrepreneurs' party, on the basis of a written agreement, is to pay the SD-LSNS more than 8 million korunas for the inclusion of its members on the lists of candidates, was published in MLADA FRONTA DNES on 10 April.

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A day later, the Central Electoral Commission recognized the SD-LSNS as a party and not a coalition. It already knew about the agreement.

Representatives of the Moravian National Party-Movement for Silesian-Moravian Unification then submitted a proposal that the resolution on accepting the lists of candidates of the SD-LSNS as a political party be revoked. The commission, however, in a new vote, confirmed its original decision to regard the SD-LSNS as a party and not a coalition. It decided eight days later—that is, on 19 April—at the suggestion of the social democrats, to ask its legal group to consider again whether the SD-LSNS is a coalition or not. [passage omitted]

According to the election law, the SD-LSNS has no chance of appealing to the court against the decision. Its only chance of overturning the verdict is to ask for a new vote in the commission; it could then alter the decision it made on Saturday. However, inasmuch as 20 of the commission's 36 members determined on Saturday that the SD-LSNS is a coalition, a change in the commission's opinion is very unlikely.

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Slovakia: SNS Draft Calls For Slovak Classes at Hungarian Schools

AU3004154296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by "sp, rej": "Legislative Council Approved Amendment to Education Law With Comments; Amendment Introduces Alternative Education"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The government's Legislative Council recommends the approval of an amendment to the Education Law, drafted by a group of deputies, under the condition that some of its provisions be revised. The Legislative Council does not consider as "a fortunate solution" the formulation chosen by the submitter in the provision concerning the teaching of individual subjects in the language of ethnic minorities and in the state language. The draft amendment was submitted by a group of Slovak National Party [SNS] deputies—M. Kollarikova, R. Septak, V. Moric, J. Slota, and J. Paska. One of the aims of the amendment is to establish conditions for children from a socially disadvantaged environment to attend a preparatory school year, to be introduced at elementary schools prior to the start of compulsory school attendance. According to the words of Deputy Prime Minister Katarina Tothova, the realization of the proposed solution hinges on the free decision of parents and also on the local conditions of individual schools. [passage omitted]

In the event of the amendment's approval, Slovak language and literature, as well as history, would be taught in the state language even at schools with a minority language as the language of instruction. This would essentially amount to the introduction of a certain form of bilingual education, which the Ministry of Education was trying to introduce last year, unsuccessfully, under the name alternative education. At that time, these efforts ran up against the strong resistance of the ethnic Hungarian public. The Legislative Council demands, however, that precisely this part of the draft be revised. "The draft amendment contradicts statements by the Ministry of Education that alternative instruction would be introduced only where the parents' will for it exists. The teaching of history at minority schools in Slovak is also a form of alternative education, and no one is asking parents about their will," says J. Berenyi, Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] secretary for education. According to A. Duka-Zolyomi, Coexistence deputy chairman, the amendment would emasculate the rights and possibilities of instruction in the Hungarian language. The amendment to the Education Law was part of the SNS's conditions for its support for the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. Under the plan of the government's legislative tasks, the drafting of a new education law is foreseen for December 1996. The SNS deputies' impatience could mean, according to J. Berenyi, that the will is lacking in the government to change the present system of ethnic minority schools according to the ideas of the SNS. The Legislative Council's attitude seems to confirm this. Gy. Bardos, spokesman for the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, remarked on this: "If they cannot push it through the government, they will do so via a deputies' proposal, and Mr. Meciar will be able to wash his hands."

Slovakia: Poll on Mochovce Safety, Completion

AU2604155696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by Juraj Alner: "Slovak Citizens' Contradictory Views on the Nuclear Power Plant's Completion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In a public opinion poll conducted by the Vienna-based Fessel + GfK Market Research Institute in July and August 1995, respondents replied to 15 questions. The "in-the-field" part of the poll was carried out by pollsters from the GfK Slovakia firm. The poll had been commissioned by the Austrian Ministry of Environment, and its results were not available to anyone else. In view of the current development of the situation around Mochovce, we asked that the results of the poll be released for NARODNA OBRODA, for which we obtained the ministry's consent.

Hence, all of the subsequent data must be considered with the reservation that they express views voiced three-quarters of a year ago, although they have not been previously published.

Why is Austria opposed to EMO's completion?

	Percent
Protection of the environment	59
Fear of nuclear power	58
Domestic political reasons in Austria	23
EMO does not meet safety standards	17
Envy and ill will	15

A total of 15 percent of those polled had not heard at all that there was discussion going on in Slovakia about the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant [EMO]. This group comprises, above all, young people under 19, blue-collar workers, people with primary

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education, people in the lowest income category, and women. Of those who did not know anything about EMO, 90 percent claim that the issue does not even interest them.

Some 58 percent of all respondents were of the opinion that the discussion on EMO is of little interest to all citizens of Slovakia because "we have far more important problems." This view is widespread among pensioners, young people, and residents of large cities, particularly Bratislava, and also among people with the highest incomes.

A total of 14 percent of respondents expressed great interest in the Mochovce issue, 27 percent "certain interest," 40 percent only marginal interest, and 20 percent no interest. The greatest interest in Mochovce was shown by white-collar workers and skilled blue-collar workers and the least interest by pensioners and people with a primary education.

Regionally, the greatest interest was shown by Bratislava residents, while the residents of all other regions of Slovakia were less interested. In West Slovakia, 63 percent of those polled did not show serious interest in the fate of Mochovce. Half of those who are not interested claimed that they did not have information on the issue. More than half of those who expressed only marginal interest are not worried about safety measures.

A total of 46 percent of respondents advocated, in principle, EMO's being put into operation, 23 percent were opposed, and 31 percent were unable to reply. The group of supporters comprised, above all, older people of working age, people with specialized education, and residents of Central Slovakia.

Those who supported EMO's completion were also asked about their motives. The most frequent replies were "we will have enough energy" and "we will be able to export energy," while other arguments were "because we started the project, we should complete it" and "energy requirements are constantly growing."

The main arguments cited by opponents of the project were inadequate safety measures and, to a lesser degree, fear for life and health or repercussions for the environment.

The opinion that the safety system in EMO would be adequate to protect the population was held by 22 percent of those polled, while 42 percent feared that safety would not be adequate. The remaining 36 percent were unable to deliver an opinion on this issue. The safety measures were distrusted even by those who take "little interest" in Mochovce. But the majority of those who expressed great interest in EMO had trust in its safety.

The view that it is irrelevant what measures are taken, because nuclear power plants pose a serious threat to life and health at any rate, was subscribed to by 81 percent of those polled. The group of those who reject this view included mostly specialists and university graduates, but, even among them, a significant majority agreed with the above statement.

The statement that an industrial state such as Slovakia needs nuclear power as a source of energy was endorsed by 77 percent of respondents, while 23 percent were of the opinion that Slovakia does not need nuclear power.

Of those who take an interest in Mochovce, almost 90 percent endorsed the view that Slovakia needs nuclear power. Most of them subscribe to the view that an alternative to it is not feasible. Only those who reject Mochovce consider foreign influence correct.

It is interesting that the majority of those polled simultaneously also agreed with the view that Slovakia should orient itself rather toward hydroelectric power and energy conservation.

A total of 41 percent of those questioned believed that it is possible to generate the energy to be produced by Mochovce also by other means, while only half of this number (21 percent) were of the opposite opinion. The remaining 38 percent did not know.

The view that, when the safety-related costs and the cost of eliminating spent nuclear fuel are taken into consideration, nuclear power plants are far more expensive than traditional power plants was supported by the majority of those polled—70 percent.

The main conditions of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] [for extending a loan for EMO's completion] were known to only 35 percent of those polled, mostly entrepreneurs, Bratislava residents, and those who do not consider any other alternative to nuclear power feasible.

The view that EMO should be completed even on the EBRD's terms was endorsed by 60 percent of those questioned, while the opposite view was held, in particular, by young people under 19 and citizens with the lowest incomes. The argument of "envy and ill will" as Austria's motive for opposition to EMO's completion was not cited by a single entrepreneur or resident of a large city. Entrepreneurs were the only group in which the majority attributed Austria's opposition to "domestic political considerations," while young people under 29, white- and blue-collar workers, and residents of larger cities attributed it to environmental considerations.

Asked which specific Austrian politicians keep harping on the Mochovce issue, 69 percent of those polled were

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unable to give a single name. The most frequently mentioned name was that of Franz Vranitzky (15 percent of respondents). The proportion of other names or groups was negligible.

The view that EMO is exclusively Slovakia's affair was held by 39 percent of people, while 61 percent consider it correct that other countries, too, want to have influence.

The latest developments have surely brought about a shift in public views and contributed to their crystallization. It is to be expected that some institution surveying public opinion will take up this issue.

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Hungary: Horn Pledges No More 'Restrictive Measures' This Year

LD0105121996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The government is not planning to introduce further restrictive measures this year, Prime Minister Gyula Horn has confirmed. Addressing a May Day celebration in Budapest's City Park, the prime minister, however, defended the planned gradual reform of the pension system over a long period of 10 years. He said that the Pension Insurance Fund's financial management is not good enough, while the number of retired people is larger than ever before. Gyula Horn also said that he is still not sure about the precise extent of liabilities undertaken by the former government, but he is ready to continue discussion with the opposition over the matter.

Nobody has the right to incite for hatred and take advantage of unsatisfaction over social problems, Laszlo Sandor, chairman of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ], the largest trade union federation, said. He said that social stability is at least as important as financial-economic equilibrium.

Endre Szabo, chairman of the Cooperation Forum of Trade Unions [SZEF, second-largest TU federation], considered solidarity with the unemployed important because their situation is hard not only from a financial but also from a moral aspect.

In his festive speech, Gyula Thuermer, chairman of the [nonparliamentary left-wing] Workers Party, urged Gyula Horn to resign. Speaking at the party's May Day celebration in Budapest, Gyula Thuermer said that the prime minister's job is not to set up foundations to fight against poverty, but to pursue a policy that prevents a situation where there are poor children. He added that people's patience is nearly exhausted because they are perfectly aware of the fact that what is going on in Hungary is not a modernization process but merely a change in the structure of ownership.

Hungary: Central Bank Shows Decreased Profits in 1995

AU3004124396 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Apr 96 p 15

[Article by Gabor Ferencz: "Suranyi Does Not Decide on the Basis of the Balance—Why Did the MNB's Profits Decrease?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although formally the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] is a corporation, its activities are not guided by market goals, and business results are not the primary consideration when its chairman makes decisions. The fact that the MNB's profit has decreased does not therefore mean that the bank has become less successful in its activities; in fact, according to one explanation, the success of the economy necessarily reduces the central bank's profit.

The MNB held its annual general meeting on 26 April. The report submitted to the finance minister, who represented the owner state, showed that the MNB's total 1995 income amounted to 430.1296 billion forints [Ft], and its costs were Ft423.5258 billion. The difference between these two, Ft6.6038 billion, is the central bank's pretax profit. This amount is Ft35.6 billion less than in 1994.

The law on the central bank defines the MNB as a corporation, but the rules applying to the MNB differ on several points from the rules on other corporations. (The existence of the law on the central bank indicates an important difference in itself.) One cannot simply limit the assessment of the company to business considerations because the central bank's decisions also form the country's economic policy, and, therefore, the MNB's chairman and leading bodies also have to bring measures that significantly reduce the bank's book results.

For example, as a result of the increased trust in the economic policy and the attainment of stabilization, the inflow of foreign capital has increased. However, the greater amount of money in circulation increased the danger of growing inflation and deteriorating balance positions, and, therefore, the MNB was forced to intervene in the market, although these lowered its results. From the viewpoint of accountancy, the central bank's results were also lowered by the fact that, because of the otherwise welcome decreasing deficit in state administration, the budget requires fewer loans, and it is receiving these more cheaply because of the falling interest rates.

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The MNB's 1995 Results in Billion Forints

	1994	1995
Expenditure		
1. Interest on deposits accounted in forints	23.9785	47.3216
2. Costs in connection with money circulation	8.8404	9.4084
3. Interest on deposits accounted in foreign currency	213.4304	303.2510
4. Other costs and losses	36.8845	53.6721
5. Operational costs of bank	8.4431	9.7827
I. All Costs (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5)	291.5769	423.5258
II. Pretax profit	42.1838	6.6038
Total (I. + II.)	333.7607	430.1296
Income		
1. Interest on loans accounted in forints	215.1798	264.7157
2. Income in connection with money circulation	15.0272	13.2906
3. Interest income accounted in foreign currency	54.0620	98.6578
4. Other income	49.4917	53.4655
Total	333.7607	430.1296

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B-H: Government Issues Statement on Freedom of Movement

AU0105183896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the tragic and unwanted events in the case of the agreed upon visits by expelled Bosniaks to graveyards and homes, the Cabinet of the Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina demands that the UNHCR, IFOR [Implementation Force], and ministries of both entities consequently implement their obligations so that, together with local authorities, they would create safe conditions for the freedom of movement. Ensuring freedom of movement is considered to be the first step in fulfilling the right of displaced people and refugees to return to their homes. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will continue to meet its obligations from the Dayton agreement, but at the same time it demands that the UN high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina influence the other side so it will implement its obligations as well.

B-H: Tuzla Official Accuses West, IFOR of 'Hypocrisy'

AU0205095996 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "International Community Not Meeting Its Obligations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Governor Izet Hadzic on Tuesday sent his condolences to the families of the murdered Bosniaks from the village of Sjenjina near Gracanica, and to Doboj Istok communal head Hasib Subasic.

"Unfortunately, even though the war is over, we are still witnesses to the hypocrisy of the international community, that is, the Implementation Force [IFOR], as the product of its policy of renewed toleration of greater Serbian nationalism. Although the peace agreement guarantees freedom of movement and the return home to everyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in practice—just as it was the case with Srebrenica—everything promised remains just a dead letter. Just like UNPROFOR failed to protect the people of Srebrenica, IFOR failed to protect the expelled Bosniaks who wanted to visit their homes and cemeteries in the Sjenjina commune, which is under the control of the Serb entity," Izet Hadzic's letter of condolence says.

Reis ul Ulema Mustafa Ceric visited the hospital in Gracanica where the wounded refugees were being treated.

The Sjenjina communal head lodged a sharp protest with IFOR over the tragic event, and yesterday was proclaimed a day of mourning in the Gracanica municipality.

B-H: Muratovic, Serb Speaker Discuss Freedom of Movement

LD0105152196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1417 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 1 May (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president [speaker] of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, told SRNA today: "The current situation is very critical, and any abuse of freedom of movement and attacks on Serb territory must be eliminated as soon as possible."

Speaker Krajisnik, at the initiative of Carl Bildt, a representative of the international community, had talks at Sarajevo airport today with Muslim Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic on freedom of movement, with special emphasis on the latest incidents in the Doboj and Trnovo areas.

According to the Serb Republic's speaker, at today's meeting, which was also attended by Carl Bildt, support was given to the efforts of the Serb and Muslim refugee affairs' ministers to adopt rules on displaced persons' visits to their former homes.

"Bildt requested that such rules be drawn up and supported. The Serb Republic government will probably adopt a standpoint on this issue on 3 May and inform the international community of its conclusions," Krajisnik said.

He added that agreement was reached at the meeting that the interior ministries of the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation would cooperate closely on investigating and eliminating excesses, and that the international police would coordinate this.

Speaking about the problems facing Serb civilians when using the Sarajevo-Trnovo road, Krajisnik said consideration was given to the idea that the whole of the Gorazde area might be considered separately and that regional commissions be formed which would cooperate and resolve the problems.

Speaking about the problem of the release of all those arrested after the signing of the Dayton agreement, the People's Assembly speaker said that Bildt and the Muslim side promised that this question would be resolved quickly.

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B-H: Ganic: Karadzic, Mladic Turning IFOR Into UNPROFOR

AU0205095496 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "IFOR Like UNPROFOR"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the passive behavior of the Implementation Force [IFOR] during the expelled Bosniaks' recent attempts to visit their homes and cemeteries in the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said that this was an attempt to turn IFOR into UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and thus freeze the situation on the ground.

"This is Karadzic and Mladic trying to take things into their own hands," Ganic said, adding that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities expected Karadzic and Mladic to be removed from authority, otherwise the Dayton agreement would be impossible to implement. Dr. Ganic categorically rejected the insinuation that the events of the past few days would prolong further attempts by the Bosniaks to visit their homes. Ganic said that this was an attempt to prevent the agreed freedom of movement, without which there could be no free elections. Therefore, Ganic said, this is an attempt to prevent the elections without which there will be no change in the authorities in the so-called Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Country's Suit Against FRY Continues in The Hague

AU0105170296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We are beginning our foreign news bloc with a report from The Hague where hearings have resumed on Bosnia-Herzegovina's suit against Yugoslavia for aggression and genocide. Here is a report by Senad Kamenica:

[Kamenica] The third day of hearings in the International Court of Justice began at 1100 this morning with a speech by Muhamed Sacirbegovic, ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations, in which Mr. Sacirbegovic replied to remarks filed by representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the last two days.

Let me remind you: Yugoslav representatives are disputing the world tribunal's jurisdiction by claiming that the Yugoslav aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina was in fact a civil war and that therefore Yugoslavia cannot be tried for aggression and the crime of genocide.

Speaking before the 15-member bench, Ambassador Sacirbegovic said that Bosnia-Herzegovina's suit against Yugoslavia is not an accusation against the people or individuals within that state, but an accusation by the attacked Bosnia-Herzegovina state against the policy of Belgrade, which had planned, organized, and launched that attack with the help of its Pale branch. As regards responsibility of individuals, the war crimes tribunal in this city is working on that.

Following Amb. Sacirbegovic, addressing the court in the role of agent, that is, the lawyer of the prosecution, was Mr. (Van Den Biesen), who confirmed from the legal aspect the legitimacy of the suit and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Mostar Mayor View Forthcoming Elections

AU0105154796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic today received Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic to discuss the elections which should be held at the end of the month.

They agreed to launch large-scale action to ensure that every Mostar citizen in the country and worldwide is able to participate in the elections. With this goal in mind [words indistinct] maximum number of Mostar citizens who are refugees abroad to come to the city, vote, and visit their city and homes. In line with the Dayton agreement, the possibility of voting must be secured in Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomatic missions abroad for those who are not able to travel to the country. This particularly pertains to the FRG, Norway, and Sweden, as they are accommodating a significant number of Mostar refugees and displaced persons.

It was agreed [words indistinct] of Mostar representatives headed by Mayor Orucevic would travel to the three countries in question and settle details pertaining to transportation for the voters—that is, for the organizing of polling stations in the closest diplomatic and consular missions and to secure funds for organizing the elections. President Izetbegovic and Mayor Orucevic appealed to all Mostar citizens, irrespective of where they are currently residing, to participate in the elections and in this way provide a strong impetus to maintaining the city's and country's integrity.

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B-H: Muslims Pose Conditions for Elections in Mostar

LD3004131896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1139 GMT 30 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 30 (TANJUG)—President of the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Kresimir Zubak, Croat, has said the Muslim side is posing conditions for the holding of municipal elections in the divided city of Mostar, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Zubak warned about this the new EU administrator for Mostar Ricardo Perez Casado of Spain, and urged that elections in Mostar be held as scheduled by the end of May, Croatian radio reported Tuesday.

Muslim Sarajevo radio reported that Muslim authorities of eastern Mostar made conditional the holding of elections on full freedom of movement, freedom of political organizing and the return of Muslim refugees to the western, Croat, section of Mostar.

Mayor of the Croat section of Mostar Mijo Brajkovic said, after meeting with Perez Casado on Monday evening that the Croat side had stuck to its demand that elections be held as scheduled for local government.

Mostar remained divided into eastern and western sections following fierce Muslim-Croat fighting in 1993. Before that, Muslims and Croats had expelled from the Mostar area about 40,000 Serbs. Under the Dayton accords, Mostar should become a single city.

Efforts to this end made by former E.U. administrator for Mostar Hans Koschnick were undermined by Croats, and Koschnick resigned.

B-H: EU's Casado Decides To Hold Mostar Elections on 31 May

AU0105154996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 May 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar will be a test for democracy in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 31 May, Mostar citizens will have the chance to elect councilors to the city council and another six municipal councils. The decision on the elections was made last night by EU Administrator Ricardo Perez Casado. In line with the Dayton agreement, and the agreement on the EU Mostar Administration, and keeping in mind the fact that local authorities are responsible for preparing elections, the EU administrator made the decision to hold elections for the city and six municipal councils.

The text of the decision that was submitted to journalists last night states that elections for the city and municipal councils will be held on Friday, 31 May 1996; election lists will be published by 10 May 1996 at the latest. Allow me to remind you that the stances of the Bosniak and Croat sides still have not been fully coordinated. Although both sides support elections, the Bosniak side believes [words indistinct] freedom of movement, political activity, organizing, and registration of political parties and media in the city.

The Croatian side, however, believes that conditions have been met for holding elections. Administrator Perez Casado himself said earlier that six weeks have to elapse between the time of announcing and the actual holding of elections. Following yesterday's decision, only four weeks remain, so there is the question of whether this will be enough time to organize elections. Another of the Bosniaks' remarks pertains to whether 20,000 expelled Mostar citizens will be able to vote.

B-H: Commission Member on 'Problem' of Election Preconditions

AU0205084796 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 6

[Report on interview with Kasim Begic, member of the OSCE Provisional Election Commission, by M. Fazlic and S. Rukavina; place and date not given: "Every Right Adorned With an Exception"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The institution that will prepare the electoral lists for the Provisional Election Commission, according to the words of Commission member Kasim Begic, will be the Statistical Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Begic told us that both the Serb and the Croat sides have already forwarded their changes to the electoral lists (those who have died, been killed, those who have come of age, etc.). However, only in June will it be known whether the elections will take place at all.

"Let me be completely clear: If, on 14 June, it is evaluated that the preconditions for the elections exist, and yet those conditions do not really exist, then the electoral rules will legalize ethnic cleansing. The problem is in the preconditions, and it is not accidental that, in Annex 3 of the Dayton agreement, the preconditions were defined before the electoral rules," Begic says.

The Solution to Dilemmas

According to that annex, it has been defined that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have active and passive electoral rights in the municipalities in which they lived in 1991. That, according to Begic, is a general right. However, an exception to the rule has

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also been anticipated, and it refers to the possibility for the commission to allow citizens to vote in the municipalities in which they are at present.

"This exception is being imposed strongly when the elementary preconditions for the elections have not been ensured," Begic says. "In other words, only if the preconditions are fulfilled—they imply the freedom of movement, expression, and political action on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and then the personal security of the citizens and their property, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the freedom of media on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina—will the exception not be imposed so heavily."

There is no dilemma as to who will decide on whether or not the preconditions have been fulfilled—Ambassador Frowick and the world. That is, all the members of the commission will be able to say what they think, but if they do not agree, Frowick will make the decision. Begic is afraid of the possibility that the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], i.e., Amb. Frowick, might start behaving like Carl Bildt, the high representative of the International Community, and so contribute to the disintegration.

"Another major problem is in the fact that, because of this exception, we will not be able to limit the number of people who will use the right to vote in the municipalities in which they are now. According to my evaluation, one third of the electorate in Bosnia-Herzegovina will make use of that exception, and that, of course, will have certain consequences, because, in that way, they also question some other rights," Begic says.

Parties From the Neighboring States

He associates the elections issue from Annex 3 with the issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons from Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement. It simply concerns—rights.

"The biggest problem is that the refugees and displaced persons are in a situation that is not an expression of their own will but of aggression and genocide, and the international community tells them about some rights to free choice on place of living, and so on. Everything started with an aggression, but the aggression has never been made official," Begic says.

Another interesting question is to what extent parties from the neighboring states—from Croatia or Serbia—will be able to take part in the elections. According to Begic, all participants in the elections will have to be registered according to our regulations.

"Besides, they will have to declare that they accept the Dayton Peace agreement. There is, however, an attempt to renew to a great extent the political configuration from 1991, i.e., for parties in Belgrade and Zagreb to install branch offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That would enable them continue their political games around Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is not stated in the electoral rules, but we will certainly not leave that question open. Tudjman, Milosevic, Seselj, etc. cannot take part in the preelection campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because that is in direct contradiction with the Dayton agreement, which defines Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign, unified, and politically independent state. If that is not made possible, then the agony of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue under peace conditions and the the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina through political means will continue, which is, in fact, what preceded the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina," says Kasim Begic, member of the Provisional Election Commission.

B-H: 'Urgent Need' Seen To Increase Independent Media

BR3004095496 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by Fredrik Braconier: "Bildt Will Have To Wait for TV Channel in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bildt-TV in Bosnia, which had been talked about in several circles, will not happen. All the talk about such a channel is pure nonsense, Michael Maclay, Carl Bildt's spokesman in Sarajevo, told SVENSKA DAGBLADET. But there is an urgent need to increase independent news broadcasting in Bosnia, he added.

Carl Bildt, the international community's high civilian representative in Bosnia, has stressed on various occasions how important it is that the country gets independent media. This is in the run-up to the elections which must be held by 14 September at the latest, according to the peace agreement. Most media in Bosnia, as in neighboring Croatia and rump Yugoslavia, are controlled by those in power. This is particularly true of the broadcast meadia since television and radio reach the largest number of people.

Bildt's endeavors have stirred up a debate in Bosnia. The head of Bosnian television in Sarajevo has said that a Bildt channel would be in violation of international law. Others have claimed that it would be more effective to support the independent media that already exist.

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Equipment From IFOR

Bildt's office seems to be prepared to take the latter line. A technical report was completed recently. The existing independent TV stations have a limited range and the ambition is to create a network that reaches the whole of Bosnia. Here the NATO-led IFOR force [Implementation Force] could play a role. It has extensive and advanced communications equipment.

It is not clear where the money would come from. The EU is one possible financier. Hungarian-born billionaire George Soros, known for his dizzying currency speculation, is another possibility. He has invested very large sums in different aid projects, which are also in the media field in East Europe. Soros' organization is already involved in Bildt's television project.

So in one way or the other perhaps Bosnia will get its Bildt-TV after all.

B-H: Serb TV Official Views Satellite Plans, New Schedule

AU2904081496 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Ilija Guzina, "main and responsible editor of Serb Radio Television," by Andzelko Anusic; place and date not given: "Two Hours on Satellite Daily"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The bombing of the radio-television relays by NATO planes last year resulted in the interruption of the television transmissions between the Pale and Banja Luka studios. Since then, a way to quickly reconstruct the radio-television system and its renewed connection has been sought in the Serb Republic.

The Serb Republic [RS] Government had a lot of understanding for this project, since the integrity [integralnost] of the radio-television system is an important factor for successful implementation of the election campaign in the RS. The task of reconstructing Serb radio-television system has been started by heavy digging machinery and has already brought about certain results. This is what we discussed with Ilija Guzina, the main and responsible editor of Serb Radio-Television [SRT]. We also spoke about the announced new SRT program schedule.

[Anusic] Which phase of reconstruction is the radio-television system of the RS in and when can we expect television transmission coverage of the entire area of the RS?

[Guzina] Unfortunately, we are still in the first phase of reconstruction and the television transmission coverage of the RS's entire area can be expected only when the second phase is completed. However, the second phase will be completed sometime in mid-June. The first phase should be completed soon. We expect this to happen any day now, sometime by the end of this week. The first phase will provide connections between the radio and television studios in Banja Luka and Pale, and this means that the signal will be received in the area of the entire Krajina, Posavina, part of Semberija, part of Podrinje, Herzegovina, and the Sarajevo-Romanija region.

[Anusic] The RS Government has set aside considerable financial means for this important task. What is the sum in question?

A Number of Studios

[Guzina] The RS Government set aside 695,000 German marks [DM] for the first phase and built four towers: one in the area of Posavina, one in the area of Duge Njive, one on Kozara, and one on Majevic. All this came from the account of the RS Government. I do not know exactly how much this cost, but it must have exceeded 1 million dinars. The RS Government granted almost DM700,000 for the first phase, and probably more than 1 million, perhaps 2 or 3 million dinars. The government has set aside DM2.5 million, and probably also considerable amounts in dinars.

Considering our present situation, I must say that these are really large sums for the RS. For those of us at the television company, however, this sum is, at the same time, quite small, since the damage resulting from the bombings is far greater, amounting to more than DM100 million.

[Anusic] In Bijelina, you stated that the SRT program will also be transmitted through two satellites—one in Europe and another in the United States. What can you tell us about this?

[Guzina] We intend to form a joint company with Paris Serb television. The Serb television network in Paris has its own program on the second channel of French television and will have its own program on the same satellite as Belgrade Television. This will be a five hour program, twice a week. Of these five hours on satellite, we will have two hours. Therefore, when we enter the system of the Serb television based in Paris, we will have studios in Paris, London, Cyprus, Frankfurt, Pale, Banja Luka, and Bijelina. For now, we will transmit for two hours twice weekly on the satellite, and later, probably on every day of the week, we will be on satellite for a few hours.

On the other hand, however, Serbs in Washington have bought a satellite transmitter—they also wish to see the

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Serb television exclusively from Banja Luka and Pale on their own channel—and they have leased the satellite. I do not know its name, but I do know that it is one of the most-watched satellites in North America. They have leased it for a full 24-hour period. I do not know what proportion of our program we will be able to provide. At this moment, it would be realistic to expect that we will be able give them two hours a day.

Main Daily Report at 2000

[Anusic] You have also announced a new SRT program schedule, and there was also talk of some new editors being named. Please give us more details about that.

[Guzina] Regarding the program schedule: It was conditioned by the satellite access of SRT, because some of our partners in Europe wanted us to produce our own exclusive program. Therefore, we cannot take over something from someone else, and this program of ours must be on the air in the time between 1900 and 2200. During this interval, we mainly have to produce an information program, as well as a documentary program, and we can eventually throw in some kind of music program. During this interval, therefore, there will be no transmission of films, and we cannot take over anything from Belgrade Television. That is why we have shifted the Belgrade television main daily report from 1930 to 2210, because we think this is a prime viewing time, and we believe that we have not considerably decreased the extent to which this program will be watched. The information program will last from 1900 until 2200, and will be exclusively our own. The central informational program will be aired at 2000 and will be called "News at Eight."

Regarding new editorial positions, there will probably only be shifts in the top of SRT. There will no longer be a main editor of the Radio and Television, but the functions will be divided: the main editor of the Radio, and the main editor of the Television. The main editor will be the director of the Radio, that is, the Television [as published]. Therefore, on the level of the Radio and Television, these two functions will be united. The role of the general manager will remain as it is. Probably, since a new law on radio-television has been passed by the Assembly, new people will be named for the three positions, and these people will be named by the government.

There have been no changes regarding the other positions within the SRT and there will most probably be none.

B-H: Plans for, Goals of Independent TV Network

AU3004123596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr-1 May 96 p 6

[Article by M. Fazlic: "One Channel—Good Reception"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The salaries of people to be employed by the independent television network that will be launched by OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], Carl Bildt's office, and the international community are still unknown. However, rough calculations have shown that some $7 million will be needed to launch the network and broadcast its six-hour program.

A Single TV Network

According to Dimiter Dimitrov, adviser to Ambassador Frowick on media developments affiliated with the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community will secure the funds based on two premises. First, the founding of an independent television network should play a great role—a positive one—in the election campaign and elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, it means the reconstruction and revival of a single television network that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the war. Since a request for frequencies has already been submitted to the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, funds are not, nor will they be, the greatest problem.

The question is how to establish a single television network whose program can be received in both entities. According to the existing draft proposal for the independent television network, this can be done in two ways:

The first way would have Bosnia-Herzegovina state and independent television stations participating in the project send their film material to a central Sarajevo studio, which would then broadcast it. The other way would be to integrate the network via satellite and existing television transmitters, Dimitrov said.

Yet another way envisages that all television stations broadcast material from their studios, while, at the same time, they would have the capability of directly tuning into the television network's program. In connection with this, the Soros Fund and a team of CNN, Harison CO, BBC, and other networks' technical experts have already visited Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They visited state and independent television stations and toured all transmitters in Bosnia-Herzegovina to assess what sort of technical and other equipment is needed to set up the network. OSCE, Carl Bildt's office,

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the Implementation Force, Internet News, USIS, the BBC, and other organizations will set up the network. The project will proceed one step at a time, television stations will be integrated so as to form a stable infrastructure.

International community representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina have decided to launch an independent television network primarily so as to reconstruct a network similar to the one before the war. Many people might think that this means reconstructing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Television network, but that is not the case, since Bosnia-Herzegovina Television broadcasts its program on a different frequency. Moreover, there is a need to secure equal media treatment for all parties and independent candidates throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina during the elections. The independent television network project is also designed to help independent television stations which in democratic societies provide the necessary balance in the media.

According to OSCE's and Bildt's plans, the independent television network will be open to all television stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the condition that they accept the regulations of the Temporary Electoral Commission on Media Behavior, as well as basic international standards pertaining to the same.

Fines

Therefore, in addition to television stations from the Federation, Serb Republic stations will also be able to participate in the network—for example, Serb Republic Television Studios Pale, Banja Luka, and so forth. However, the most important thing is that the stations will have to honor the spirit of Dayton—that is, the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina is an integral, internationally recognized state. Naturally, there will also be a media commission to assess the work of all television stations and other media in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In case of a violation of regulations, the responsible media will be penalized and perhaps fined.

It is interesting to note that the ethnic structure of those employed by the network will be balanced; in the beginning, international staff will also be employed alongside the local staff.

I do not want television stations or other media to be stripped of the already small number of professionals. Moreover, we shall employ unemployed journalists who are influential in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as personnel from the local media, but on contract, Dimitorv said.

Contract employment means that people who will get jobs with the independent television network will work for it for a period of time determined by the contract, after which they will go back to their media houses. Moreover, everything will be done in agreement and coordination with television stations participating in the project.

Finally, for the project to succeed, it will have to win the support of television stations and also the Bosnia-Herzegovina public. OSCE sincerely hopes that support will be forthcoming.

[Box, p 6]

Domestic Production

The independent television network's program scheme has not been defined yet, but it will consist of four program segments. The first, a political program, will stress elections; all parties and independent candidates will be treated equally during the election campaign. Next is the information program, objective and professionally put together in line with international standards. The education program will be ethnically balanced and will not contain elements that would insult or deprecate other ethnic communities, while the entertainment program will support urban culture and the values of a civilized society. All segments will maximally support domestic production.

B-H: Bildt: Independent TV Network Could Be Opened Shortly

LD2704135996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1342 GMT 27 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 27 (TANJUG)—The high representative of the international community, Carl Bildt, has said that an independent television network could shortly be opened in Bosnia.

Bildt thus underscored that the election campaign in Bosnia would not be left in the hands of the official television stations of the two entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb State Republika Srpska.

The Voice of America radio said that "in the territory of Bosnia- Herzegovina there is a fierce media battle" which could largely determine the fate of projects on the preservation of Bosnia as an integral state.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will by May complete a project for an independent tv station in Bosnia after which there will remain three months for erecting "independent" relays.

The Voice of America claims that the competition will force "the state-owned television in Sarajevo, which

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is unprofessional and propaganda-oriented, to become more democratic."

B-H: JUL Protests Abolishment of Serbian TV Newscast Relays

AU2704201396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 27 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The JUL [Yugoslav Left] Republican Committee for the Serb Republic [RS] has been held in Banja Luka. Here is a report by Branislav Bozic:

[Bozic] The RS's Committee of the United Left today decided to change the organization's name into the Yugoslav Left for the RS, it was announced at a news conference in Banja Luka. As journalists were told by Mile Ivosevic, president of the JUL Committee for the RS, the prerequisites for this name change were created back in November 1991, when at its plebiscite in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serb people decided in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia. Our orientation is in favor of Yugoslavia as a political and state community of all Serb theaters [prostor], Ivosevic said. Nonetheless, we are an authentic organization for the RS, and proceed from the interests of the RS as a country we live in.

Ivosevic pointed out that the JUL for the RS is linked to the territory of the RS, but will cooperate with all leftist forces in the RS and beyond. The RS's JUL president told the journalists that within the preparations for the coming elections is a corresponding elections board [stab] to which the JUL Committee for the RS transfers authorization to make decisions for the needs of the elections.

The JUL expressed a particular protest against and indignation over the abolishment of the Radio-Television of Serbia [RTS] television newscast, which was until recently relayed by local television, as the RS signal cannot reach this region.

B-H: Bildt Spokesman: Karadzic, Mladic Orchestrated 'Incidents'

AU0105155696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 May 96

[Report by Fuad Cibukcic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cibukcic] (?At this morning's) news conference held in Sarajevo's Holiday Inn Hotel journalists were addressed by spokesmen from the Implementation Force [IFOR], High Commissioner Carl Bildt's office, the UNHCR, and the United Nations.

IFOR spokesman Simon Haselock underscored the problem of freedom of movement, but he refused to confirm that a change of the international forces' policy was to be expected soon [words indistinct]. Haselock confirmed that the issue was of utmost importance in the international forces' job and added:

[Haselock in English with consecutive Serbo-Croatian translation] Freedom of movement is a crucial issue in the peace agreement worked out for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Freedom of movement, travel, and existence [words indistinct] closely linked to the return of refugees [words indistinct] farms and places where they used to live are closely related to the planned elections which should be held in several months' time.

[Cibukcic] The spokesman identified the Serb authorities as being responsible for the incidents in the past several days, and for not honoring the basic democratic principle of freedom of choice, existence, and movement. He assessed these Serb actions as being the first step towards a serious violation of peace.

Haselock said that convoys and mass visits would be limited in the coming period, as the [words indistinct] were not ready to secure safety of all persons.

Colum Murphy, spokesman for High Commissioner Carl Bildt, began his address to the press by reading a letter which Bildt sent to the Serb entity's Assembly Chairman Momcilo Krajisnik. In his letter, Bildt stressed concern regarding yesterday's events in the village of Kapetanovici near Doboj and described the shooting of Bosniak (?civilians) as a criminal act. After reading the text of Bildt's letter, spokesman Murphy said:

[Murphy in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We are no longer in a wartime situation, and the question of killing is now qualified as a crime. [Words indistinct] that has already started, and is being carried out by the Serb police, the international police, IFOR's military police, and Federation police.

[Cibukcic] According to Colum Murphy, Carl Bildt has passed on all relevant information to Ejup Ganic. A trilateral meeting was scheduled for 1100 [0900 GMT] between republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, Serb Assembly Chairman Momcilo Krajisnik, and High Commissioner Carl Bildt. According to Murphy, recent incidents would be the main topic.

UNHCR spokesman (Max Nieberg) made a brief statement for the press:

[(Nieberg) in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities will today release four Bosniak prisoners imprisoned since 10 April. The UNHCR [words indistinct] this afternoon, so they can be expected in Bosnia tomorrow.

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[Cibukcic] (Nieberg) said that the remaining group comprised 222 prisoners from Zepa and Srebrenica, 13 of which were held because of suspicion that they were responsible for war crimes. Following UNHCR intervention, nine were released earlier; the remaining four will be released today.

Finally, one more thing. After a journalist said that war criminals Karadzic and Mladic had orchestrated the weekend incidents, the spokesman for Carl Bildt's Office said:

[Murphy in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] [Word indistinct] and I have spoken very seriously about the war criminal issue, and the fact that they are directly connected to the weekend incidents.

B-H: IFOR Blames Bosnian Serbs for Refugee Clashes

AU0105154896 Paris AFP in English 1351 GMT 1 May 96

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 1 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) Wednesday for the first time blamed Bosnian Serb refusal to permit full freedom of movement for violent clashes between Serbs and returning Moslems refugees.

IFOR took a firmer stance against hardline Serbs preventing Moslems trying to return to their homes in line with provisions of the Dayton peace accords, as it braced for more clashes between refugees and hostile Serbs.

Carl Bildt, the high representative in charge of implementing the civilian aspects of the accord, met with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic and Serb Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik at Sarajevo airport Wednesday to resolve the refugee crisis.

IFOR meanwhile confirmed the death of a second Moslem in an incident Monday when refugees tried to gain access to Serb-controlled areas near the northern town of Doboj by skirting around a NATO checkpoint.

The NATO-led force has been warned of three "possible flashpoints" where trouble could break out, at planned marches by Moslem refugees in the areas of Memici, Brcko and Olovo, a US official said here.

He dismissed as "inaccurate" reports from the Bosnian Serb media, allegedly based on IFOR reports, that 10,000 Moslems were planning to march to Brcko, which is under Serb control.

But he said clashes were possible outside Memici, Brcko and Olovo and said NATO troops in the area had been "prepared."

"Some of these incidents turned to violent tragedy thanks to the refusal of one community on one side of IEBL (the inter-entity borderline), mostly Serbs, to accept visits of refugees from another ethnic group, mostly Moslems," said IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock on Wednesday.

He said the Serbs' refusal to let through Moslem refugees was "a flagrant abrogation of their commitments to the peace agreement."

IFOR had on Tuesday only called on all parties to comply with the treaty without singling out the Serbs, drawing criticism from the press and Bosnian officials.

"The freedom to move and travel and live where you choose is tied closely to the return of more refugees and to the future of the national election to be held in the next few months," Haselock added. "The plain fact is that freedom of movement in Bosnia is still short of absolute."

The feared outbreaks of violence come just two days after clashes which left two people dead and several injured.

IFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Max Marinner confirmed one victim was killed by mine explosions, when a group of Moslems tried to get round an IFOR road block and Serb demonstrators to enter Doboj.

But he refused to confirm reports by local press and Moslem sources that a second victim was shot in the chest. He said the shooting incident was still being investigated.

"A speedy investigation has been promised," said Bildt's spokesman Colum Murphy, adding that Bildt "expects speedy results and we will get them.

"The investigation should not be a whitewash. Carl Bildt is very tough on this one."

IFOR set up roadblocks to prevent groups of Moslems returning to the Republika Srpska—the Serb entity created under the Dayton peace accord—fearing clashes.

Former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic warned Tuesday that Bosnia could slide back into war unless the NATO-led force helped refugees return to their former homes.

The refusal of Serbs to allow Moslems to return home and IFOR's refusal to force a passage for them "means division of Bosnia and division of Bosnia means a big war," Silajdzic warned.

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IFOR insists that it is not its job to ensure the return of refugees and places that responsibility on civilian local authorities, local police and the understaffed UN police force.

The issue of the return of the 2.4 million refugees and displaced people, mostly Moslem and mostly driven from their homes by Serbs during the war, is seen by civilian peace officials as a key to the future of the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: IFOR Blames Muslim 'Extremists' for Doboj Incident

LD0105164896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 1 May (SRNA)—Initial findings show that Muslim extremists were behind an incident two days ago in the vicinity of the Serb village of Sjenina Rijeka, 7 km northeast of Doboj, Pasi Karonen, spokesman for the IFOR's [Implementation Force] Nordic-Polish brigade told SRNA today.

He said the investigation into the incident of 29 April when two people were killed and seven injured has shown that the "Muslims ignored warnings by the IFOR Swedish battalion to abandon their attempts forcibly to enter the [Bosnian] Serb Republic."

"A group of about 30-40 Muslims refused to heed the warning by the Swedish battalion, and at about 1630 hours on 29 April the group skirted the IFOR checkpoint 600 meters west of the bridge on the Sjenina River," Karonen said.

According to Karonen, after this, "six explosions were heard, most of them from antipersonnel mines, but several others from some as yet unidentified sources. This caused the death of two and the wounding of seven people of Muslim nationality."

"Following the incident, the International Police Task Force asked for the Gracanica-Sjenina Rijeka road, which the Muslims planned to use, to be closed until the incident had been clarified," Karonen said.

Marinko Tomic, commander of the local police station in Sjenina Rijeka, said that, during their attempt to forcibly enter the Serb Republic territory two days ago, the Muslims used hand grenades and fired from a bazooka in the direction of the village.

Bjorn Ridmark, an officer of the Tuzla-based Eagle operative group information service, said at a news conference in Doboj yesterday that there were indications that the Muslims would again try to force their way into the Serb Republic northeast of Teslic.

B-H: Pale Authorities Release 2 Bosniak Prisoners

AU0105155096 Paris AFP in English 1417 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 1 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb authorities released Wednesday two Moslem prisoners who were being held in this Serb stronghold near the capital Sarajevo.

An AFP reporter watched as Ahmet Bucman and Husnij Jusufovic, who were being held with 15 other Moslems pending investigations into war crimes allegations, were set free.

B-H: Data Compared on Number of War Victims

AU2604173996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Boro Maric: "The Number of Victims as Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is it true—as it is claimed more and more often—that 250,000 people died in the wars waged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia? This number of victims was mentioned by President Bill Clinton for the first time when the Dayton peace agreement was signed.

The data published so far by the warring factions are a serious warning that the proportion of bloodshed—expressed in human lives, wounded, and the missing—was an object of manipulation in order to gain the sympathy of public opinion and the international community.

The Republic of Croatia Government published on 15 June 1992 that 3,658 people had died and 20,000 were wounded in the war with the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

According to that report, which was broadcast by Croatian Radio, half of the dead were civilians and 1,286 soldiers. For 643 dead persons it was not stated who or what they were.

Approximately 15 days ago, Josko Juras, the deputy defense minister for civilian issues of the Republic of Croatia, quoted the following data: 7,021 dead, 24,824 wounded, and 1,243 missing Croatian citizens.

Where Is the Difference?

In comparing these data we have to bear in mind that from the end of 1991 until 9 August 1995—when the Republic of Serbian Krajina Government fell after the fall of Dvor na Uni—the war was waged in the territory of the present Croatia only from time to time.

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The Croatian Army performed the operations "Maslenica," "Flash," and "Storm," which—according the information issued by the Croatian Government—were completed with a minimum in loses.

In the "Storm" operation, which was the largest according to the number of participating forces and the area of performance, the Croatian armed forces suffered 182 victims. This was stated by Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak in a session of the Croatian parliament.

He also stated in a Croatian parliament session that in the "Flash" operation—in which the Croatian Army occupied the Republic of Serbian Krajina part of western Slavonija—48 Croatian soldiers and policemen died.

If we add the statement, issued by President Tudjman, that in operations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which 75,000 Croatian soldiers participated last year, not more than 120 of them died, there automatically arise certain questions. The most important are: If it is true that the Croatian armed forces had minimum losses from the beginning of 1992 until the end of the war, from where does the difference of 3,163 dead and 4,000 wounded between mid-1992 and October 1994 arise? The second question is whether the number of dead Croatian soldiers, policemen, and civilians will rise in the future, too. If this is the case, then it is evident that Croatia reduced the number of its victims in order to retain the combat morale of its armed forces.

The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia had—officially at least—bigger losses than the Republic of Croatia. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had 8,000 dead and 24,000 wounded by 7 August 1994.

These data are stated in the Declaration adopted by the Chamber of Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in its special session held in Livno. After that, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not publish information on their losses.

Previously, Mr. Jadranko Prlic, then prime minister of Herzeg-Bosnia, stated in Posusje on 4 August 1993 that around 4,000 members of the Croatian Defense Council had died since the beginning of the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serbian Republic, stated recently that, according to some data, 17,000 members of the Serbian armed forces and 7,000 civilians died in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Top Secret

The Muslims claim that they have had the biggest losses since the beginning of the bloodshed in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is most probably true, but it is also true that the number of the dead and wounded in the Muslim part of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a secret.

Haris Silajdzic, the former prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, is the first one to publicly state that 200,000 Muslims had died since the beginning of 1994.

This number is treated as the official number of victims at the end of the war, as if in the meantime—until October 1995—there had not been additional victims.

Silajdzic's statement is overshadowed by the data issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of Bosnia-Herzegovina about 148,000 dead in the whole of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The information was published approximately at the end of 1994 and is largely based on assessments.

Foreign analysts assessed that the Muslim side had between 30,000 and 68,000 victims, both soldiers and civilians, until the beginning of 1995.

That this information has to be taken with reserve can be seen in the example of a report broadcast by the Bosniak radio in Tesanj. Analyzing the daily information issued by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina Press Center in Tesanj, which was carried by Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was calculated that on the Tesanj front all the tanks of the 1st Krajina Corps (two armored brigades) were destroyed or seized, and that the Muslim army made an advance of not less than 700 km. In other words, it reached the Slovene-Austrian border!

[Box, p 4]

Krajina

From the first conflicts in the territory of the present Croatia until the fall of the Serbian Republic of Krajina, 4,662 people died. Most of them—1,410—died in the "Storm" action, which was performed by the Croatian Army and special police units.

B-H: IFOR Mission Seen as Model for Future NATO Actions

LD2904111696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1056 GMT 29 Apr 96

["Pool" item by Slobodan Jankovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bonn, April 29 (TANJUG)—When it was decided that NATO should be one of the pillars of the Ifor [Implementation Force] peace mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was clear that some other times are coming for settling crisis spots.

The departure of Unprofor from Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought about by provocations that subsequently

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"paved" the way to the rapid reaction force, as an advance party to NATO, announced that the Western military alliance would soon assume a new role of "extinguisher of fire" in areas where fires of war were still smouldering.

In his lecture recently delivered in Bonn, German General Manfred Eisele, in charge of the military aspect of U.N. peacekeeping missions in the world, confirmed that the Ifor experience was a "pattern" for future NATO operations.

This is the best example of the Western alliance's capabilities to operate also in future peacekeeping operations, Eisele stressed.

Eisele found a legal possibility for NATO's involvement in such missions in Article 8 of the U.N. Charter that provides for U.N. cooperation with regional organizations in securing peace. In such a manner, the U.N. could react more readily, and also have a better understanding of the historic reasons behind some conflicts and resolve them more quickly, Eisele said.

Eisele was full of praise for NATO (and of the Americans of course) and characterized it as the sole capable political and military regional organization in the world on which the U.N. can rely on.

In Eisele's assessment the inclusion of Russian troops into Ifor proved there was a "key" for resolving the problems of NATO's eastward expansion.

Eisele said he had doubts about the limiting of the Ifor mandate to one year, assessing it as an interesting experiment with a stop-watch.

Eisele said he believed a two-year mandate would be right for Bosnia just as the one given to the U.N. mission in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem and to the international police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B-H: Bosnian, Croatian Firms To Build Ships for Iran

AU2504201796 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Apr 96 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Firms From Bosnia-Herzegovina Take Part in the Construction of Ships"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 April (ONASA)—The agreement on forming a consortium from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to participate in the construction of ships for Iran was signed yesterday in the Chamber of Commerce of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The agreement was signed by representatives from "Energoinvest" and "Unioninvest" from Sarajevo, "Remontmontaza" and "Umel" from Tuzla, and "Krivaja" from Zavidovici. The representatives of "Sipad," "Unis," "Fering" from Gracanica, and "Zeljezara" from Zenica, who had joined the consortium in preliminary talks, did not come to the signing.

It was concluded that the deadline for these four companies to sign the agreement should be 24 April of this year. If not, the consortium will consist only of those companies that have signed the agreement.

A three-party agreement between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Iran anticipates the construction of four multipurpose ships, of a total carrying capacity of 22,000 tons, to be be constructed in the Split shipyard. The members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina consortium will take part in the project through the supply of equipment, products, and services. To that purpose the consortium will form its units in Split.

B-H: Serb Republic Socialist Party Holds Conference

AU2704193296 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 27 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The first conference of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS] was held in Kozarska Dubica. Here is a report by Radovan Brankov:

[Begin recording] [Brankov] Marko Zgonjanin, president of the SPS Municipal Committee for Kozarska Dubica, said what the Socialists of the region want first of all. We first of all want peace. We want to develop our town, our municipality, and its every village. We want the firmest political, economic, cultural, and every other link with our mother country, Serbia, which is the only guarantee for our survival. Speaking about the current situation and the official authorities in the Serb Republic [RS], SPRS Vice President Zivko Radisic said the following:

[Radisic] Our basic goal is not to come to power, as some would like to present it. Poor are those people who come to power. However, I must say that we are all poor if the practice applied so far is continued.

[Brankov] Many replies to questions asked in Kozarska Dubica today were given by a guest at this conference, Radmilo Bogdanovic, member of the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]:

[Bogdanovic] What we should do today is offer these people a program, organize it, and when candidates appear for one, the other, or a third or fourth party, let the people (?independently) decide (?whom they favor), and when elections are organized, the one who gets the majority should form the government, and

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organize authorities in the RS on the basis of laws and regulations. [end recording]

B-H: Yugoslav Left, Independent Socialists To Cooperate

AU3004171996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At their meeting in Bijeljina, representatives of the Regional Committee of the Yugoslav Left of the Serb Republic and the Party of Independent Socialists agreed to mutual cooperation in the electoral activities. The two parties will work in favor of issues pertaining to peace in the region and the consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement, it is pointed out in the announcement issued after the meeting.

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Croatia: Serb Official Presents 'Government' Program

AU0205111596 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Address by Vojislav Stanimirovic, "chairman of the Regional Executive Council of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," at the second session of the Assembly of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem in Beli Manastir on 27 April; from the "Vise od Vesti" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Passage indistinct] the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem was a multinational, multicultural, and multiconfessional [multikonfesionalan] community. Let me remind you that—even after what happened from 1991 to 1995—it is still multinational, multicultural, and multiconfessional, and it is the only such community in Croatia. We must preserve its character through the implementation of the Erdut Agreement. The basic agreement signed by the Croatian and Serb sides on 12 November 1995 offers the legal basis for that, provided that the Croatian side with the mediation of the international community, really wants to establish a lasting and just peace and solution. I think the role of the international community in all that should first of all be to set the scene for peace and security without imposing a solution outside the basic agreement.

Furthermore, I must point out that the tragedy of the district began when Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] regime came to power and he refused to accept the results of the first multiparty elections held in the district in 1990. At that time, the extreme HDZ won in neither Vukovar Municipality nor Beli Manastir Municipality, our two largest centers. In the past couple of years, Croatia began its ethnic cleansing in Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, and western Slavonia, where Serbs have lived for centuries. The Croatian regime aims to conquer the entire territory and is doing everything to force the Serb population to move out of the Serb district of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

Considering all that, the international community is obliged—in keeping with the Erdut Agreement—to provide a solution that would give the Serb district the status of a territorial autonomy unit [jedinica teritorijalne autonomije] based on the Carrington plan for settling the crisis in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [SFRY].

It is common knowledge that the international community recognized Croatia chiefly because Croatia expressed its willingness to provide a special status for certain parts of its territory where the Serbs have an absolute or relative majority. As the provisions for the special status are not in contradiction with the Erdut Agreement, they can be the solution in the present circumstances. Moreover, the solution for the district must reflect the will of its population as well as citizens who lived here until 1991, but also of refugees from other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Croatia who settled in the district because the Croatian authorities prevented them from remaining in their homeland.

Bearing in mind the fact that, on the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Serb district is the only multinational, multicultural, and multiconfessional community, as stated, the Executive Council will base its activities on the full protection of the members of all ethnic groups, their equality, and the highest level of human rights and freedoms. A prerequisite for this is the establishment of lasting peace and just solutions to all controversial issues, for only in such conditions can one guarantee that the above will be implemented. The Executive Council accepts the peaceful solution of all controversial issues through negotiations respecting the principle of equality and mutual respect. The Executive Council will be fully open to cooperation with UNTAES; that is, the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, as well as with other international organizations and the institutions of interested countries in order to fully protect the district and its citizens and to promote the quality of their life.

To that end, one of the council's priority task will be to develop a general platform for negotiations with Croatia and the international community, with an emphasis on a centralized system of negotiations and full control over the negotiating process to avoid uncooperativeness, improvisations, and defensive negotiating positions. Since the Erdut Agreement envisages the demilitarization of the district, the Executive Council will take steps to realize the process in the spirit of the agreement and in keeping with the demands made by the international community.

Furthermore, the Executive Council demands a full guarantee of the international community for the safety of its citizens because, to be objective, the cause of the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats on the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia has, so far, not been eliminated. Consequently, the Executive Council will prepare the citizens in case we need to defend ourselves.

The basic principles of the political activities of the Executive Council will focus on the development of full democracy modeled on highly developed European

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countriesand based on the freedom of political activity and a law-ordered state, as well as other generally accepted principles.

As a direct result of the war and the occupation of certain Serb areas on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Croatia and the political uncertainty resulting from the conflicting interests in our area, certain state bodies and institutions have partly ceased to function and an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspense has been created, which led to a series of negative events. We have marked an increase in some kinds of crime, emigration, the inadequate treatment of material and natural resources, a lack of interest, apathy, etc. In order to overcome the situation I have briefly described, the Executive Council will reorganize and raise to a more professional level the bodies of the Interior Ministry so that, together with other services and institutions, they can fight against crime and other negative phenomena to guarantee the safety of our citizens and their property, of course in full cooperation with UNTAES members within the framework of the Erdut Agreement. We will consolidate the organization and personnel of our justice system—courts, the prosecutor's office, the petty crime court, the public attorney's office, the constitutional court, lawyers, and jails—in order to make it more timely, professional, and better qualified. We will reorganize customs and inspection services so that they can fulfill their function as defined by the law. Furthermore, the Executive Council will, as soon as possible, determine the structure and organization of other government bodies and institutions, as well as other bodies and organizations like the school system, health service, business organizations, etc. We will find the best possible solution for their functioning in the given circumstances. In doing that, expertise, professionalism, and rationalization will be our main criteria. The Executive Council will try to provide the minimum material and technical conditions for improving their work.

Compared with the district's assembly [as heard], the Executive Council will focus on developing and improving parliamentary democracy and the multiparty system and enacting laws that will reflect the equality of citizens and the protection of human rights and freedoms and satisfy the demands of a law-governed state.

On the economic scene, the Executive Council will promote a speedy economic recovery of the district, as well as an intensive economic development with the goal of consolidating the entire economic structure of the district in order to attain a higher level of economic independence, which is a must in the present circumstances, as it has a direct influence on political independence as well. On the other hand, such economic structure must be fully open to the international division of labor and foreign investment.

The Executive Council will stimulate intensive rebuilding and development of economic facilities—"Kombinat Borovo [word indistinct]" "Belje-Vupik," [word indistinct], "Iteks," wine cellars—using their full potential, making them more profitable, and creating more jobs with whatever resources are available. The Executive Council will stimulate the opening of smaller industrial facilities in towns and villages, especially in underdeveloped border areas so as to improve the quality of life there. Moreover, the Executive Council will pave the way for the maximal use of the land pool and agricultural capacity so as to fulfill the needs of the population and marketing. In other words, the Executive Council will do its best to round off the spring sowing. The Executive Council will set the scene for private initiative and private investment, stimulating critical activities [deficitarne djelatnosti] both in the field of production and [word indistinct].

The Executive Council's special task will be to establish and control, through its bodies, the rule of law in the activities of economic and other subjects, with the emphasis of financial discipline. The Executive Council will take every measure at its disposal to develop financial institutions and preserve the present monetary system. A key task of the Executive Council will be to develop a unified and advanced communications system and its inclusion in European system of communications. Starting with the importance of the Danube River as an international inland waterway, the Executive Council will do its best to ensure our interests, primarily through the reconstruction of the Vukovar river port and at the same time aware of international interests as well.

In order to realize all those and other economic goals, the Executive Council will try to secure its own means, as well as the means of the international community.

Regarding welfare policy, the priority task of the Executive Council will be to find a solution for the protection of disabled veterans, the families of dead soldiers, the unemployed, pensioners, and other underprivileged categories, trying to establish unified and objective criteria. Furthermore, the Executive Council undertakes to create a unified system of financing general needs and distribution of funds.

The Executive Council will find the means to discourage emigration from the district, to provide minimum living conditions for refugees from the start, and to give humanitarian care to refugees and displaced persons from other areas of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Croatia.

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Regarding the return of refugees to the district—bearing in mind the provisions of the Erdut Agreement—in negotiations and the implementation of the agreement, the Executive Council will insist on the principle of full reciprocity.

The Executive Council realizes the role and importance of information in the modern world, especially in our situation, and will therefore try to create a unified information system with an up-to-date organization and technology that is well trained to response to the call of the present time and interests of citizens and will try to find the way to be included in the international communications system.

As the district is a multinational and multicultural whole, the Executive Council will provide equal treatment and protection of all cultural treasures and develop all cultural activities. Furthermore, the Executive Council will stimulate the development of all sorts of sports activities by organizing clubs and associations, competitions, and other sports events and try to set the scene for inclusion in international sports organizations.

The Executive Council will nurture relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious communities, with mutual respect and tolerance.

My fellow deputies, ladies and gentlemen, the program of the Executive Council that I have just presented to you was drawn up in very specific and trying circumstances, and in a very short time. It is just a framework of basic elements and orientation of our activities. Everyday life and future events will reveal the true shape of our program and make it more concrete and precise. The program that I have presented will be the starting point and platform for solving some problems that we will encounter at certain point. I have read the program, but you may find some parts ambiguous. It only provides the framework, our basic orientation, and we will have to elaborate and work on it to match the circumstances.

Finally, let me add that we, myself and the secretaries of the Executive Council, answer to you for what we do and will keep you posted on our activities. In other words, you are the assembly with legislative and supervising authority over us, so that the assembly will be kept abreast of our work and we will ask for your opinion and approval. Thank you. [applause]

Croatia: Eastern Slavonia Serbs Form 'Provincial Government'

AU0105205696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Report by Dajana Djukic on the constituent session of the executive council of "the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem" held in Beli Manastir on 29 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the unanimous [words indistinct] that took place at the second session of the assembly of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, which was held in Beli Manastir, the provincial government, headed by [words indistinct] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, became uncompromisingly and deeply involved in resolving the most current issues in the life of this Serb territory.

At yesterday's session, during which the government members were elected and sworn in, many important decisions were made. Dajana Djukic has the following report:

[Djukic] The necessary and basic part of the income of all those who work in the education sector in the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem will be paid on 30 April. This is the essence of the decision made at yesterday's session of the executive council of our province. Yesterday's session was a constituent one, and was chaired by the newly appointed prime minister, Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic.

Several current issues concerning various spheres of life in the area of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem were considered, and working agreements were reached concerning the activity of the secretariats.

Members of the provincial executive council took the oath before the president of the provincial assembly, Borivoje Zivanovic, thus publicly expressing their decision to subject their professional and intellectual abilities to the interests of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem during their mandate.

Yesterday's decision of the provincial government concerning the payment of the basic part of the income of all employees in education in the area of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem was implemented today, as was confirmed to our reporters in several Baranja elementary and high schools.

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Croatia: Political 'Crisis,' Opposition's Response Noted

AU0205092496 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Mirjana Kasapovic: "The Only Response to the 'Legal Dictatorship' in Zagreb Is the Democratic Supercoalition of Opposition Parties!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the crisis in Zagreb initially might have been caused by inconsistent regulations and procedures as well as by the tactical moves of the two sides, it is now clear that the causes and consequences of the entire case are much more serious.

In the political sense, the situation in Zagreb—and throughout the country—has deteriorated since October 1996, when the crisis began with the defeat of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] in both city and county elections.

What has happened since then?

A "dictatorship of law" has been established in the capital, the democratically gained right of the majority in the Town and Municipality Assembly to appoint the executive officers has been suspended, and authority decreed by the president of state.

Because those "dictator's rights" were derived from valid Croatian laws, it is a case of so-called small, local, legal dictatorship. The appointed administrator of the city and county operates without the support of the electoral majority. Because that situation is incompatible with the principles of democratic law that our Constitution fosters, we could have escaped this situation in two ways.

First, the valid regulations that give "dictator's rights" to the head of the state could have been suspended in the parliament, as well as the present request for those to be suspended for contextual reasons.

If those regulations were really created—as we were told during the past period—to provide a legal basis for a presidential veto on alleged county prefects of "Serbian counties" in Croatia (which existed as a project) who might be unacceptable for state reasons, those now have no reason to exist.

At present, we will not discuss the issue of the extremely dubious political purpose and efficiency of regulations that enable the head of state to decree authority to the county prefects of Knin and Glina without causing periodic crises in the state politics.

Nevertheless, let us suppose that under special circumstances or in the state of war, such as was in Croatia during recent years, exceptional legal rights can be given or, at least, extraordinary flaws can happen.

Dictatorship or Rule of Law?

Had those regulations been annulled, the appointment of an opposition mayor and county prefect would be possible. The HDZ, however, will never allow that to happen.

Second, insisting on the existing regulations damages the entire rule of law. Certain state and party executives and their media representatives have ventured to revise the very idea of rule of law.

The least intelligent among them have come dangerously close to "simply" defining rule of law as any state that has laws! That is the best way to declare the most brutal dictatorship a rule of law.

They think that rule of law means the application of existing laws, whatever they mandate. In their opinion, the president of our state is not doing anything wrong, dubious, or undemocratic by refusing to ratify an appointment of an opposition politician as mayor of Zagreb—he is just acting according to the law.

Meanwhile, the modern political liberalism implies that rule of law includes the recognition of certain individual rights and freedoms and protection of those from being controlled or endangered by the ruling party. Among those are the basic political rights and freedoms that are being endangered in this crisis.

During the entire crisis, we have repeatedly noticed the HDZ's "liquidation syndrome" when it comes to the political opposition. We might say it is a genuine "Indian syndrome": The only good opposition is a (politically) dead opposition.

This negative attitude toward the political opposition is declared by the recent annexations of small political parties, which was presented as widening the circle of helpful state-creating partners of the HDZ.

HDZ's Partners

Among such partners we find the Croatian Christian Democratic Party [HKDS] that got only 17,000 votes (0.7 percent) in the parliamentary elections last year. However, the most disgusting issue in the moral sense is the fact that the late Ivan Cesar, who was in his time publicly denounced by the HDZ as "udbas" [member of Yugoslav State Security Service] and one of the collaborators in the assassination of Croatian dissident Bruno Busic, used to be the leader of the HKDS.

Another new statemaking partner is the Croatian Conservative Party [HKS], who won as many as 7,000 votes

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(0.3 percent) in the last parliamentary elections. Such political potential, coupled with obscure ideas periodically published by the party's founders, make the party a worthy political partner. At least, such is the impression one gets from the way the state television treats the historical agreement of the HDZ with that and similar parties.

For Croatian state television it could be the news of the day, according to the criteria that make, for instance, Franjo Tudman's visit to the Archeological Museum the news of the day. By the way, the reason for that probably is not just the political bias of the editors of the central news program, but also their professional incompetence. They demonstrate daily their ignorance of basic journalistic categories like the one of the news of the day. They persistently talk about "the most important news of the day" in plural form. If an event becomes the news of the day, of course it is important. And if only one event, the most important one, has the right to be called the news of the day, we cannot talk about the news of the day in plural form. However, this professional deviation solves political problems, and it automatically turns everything that Franjo Tudman, Goran Ivanisevic, Iva Majoli and some other people do into the news of the day—beside events that really are the news of the day.

Democratic Supercoalition

The genuine opposition parties must respond to the obstinate attempts of the HDZ to carry out the concept of the satelite pluralism by preserving their political independence, which includes the right to freely choose their coalition and political partners.

The ruling party must be aware that recent events will make it more difficult for them to find coalition partners among the really respectable opposition parties. For instance, what could urge the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] to form a political coalition with the ruling party that found the most prominent liberals "not good enough" to be the mayor of Zagreb?

Who is good enough for the HDZ?

An "ordinary" coalition would not be an appropriate answer to the tendencies and circumstances revealed during the political crisis in Zagreb, which is due to bring us new elections in the town and the municipality. The only appropriate response would be a democratic supercoalition.

Croatia: Istrian Democratic Party Alleges Defeat for HDZ

LD0105181396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Istrian Democratic Assembly [IDS] said today that the decision by the Croatian Government to disband the Zagreb City and County Assembly is a political defeat for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], despite its attempt to use legal argument to justify it.

In its statement, the IDS congratulates the opposition on its consistency and resilience. The party expects the Croatian Government to call immediately new elections.

Croatia: General on Reintegration, Demilitarization

AU0205114496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 96 pp 10-11

[Interview with Major General Slavko Baric, head of the Executive Committee for the Military Issues of the Government Office for Eastern Croatia, by Branko Vrbosic; place and date not given: "Demilitarization Will Be Over by 7 July!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] has done more in three months than UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] in three years, rarely is a person satisfied with the present situation in Croatia's occupied east. True, that area formally belongs to Croatia, and UN Security Council Resolution 1037 and the UNTAES mission ensure the success of the peaceful reintegration. However, it is a process which lasts for too long, and one has constantly been waiting for a sign that the process is going in the desired direction. When something like that happens, one is looking for a new sign—and that is the way it will be until Croatian authorities take over the entire, internationally recognized state territory. The most concrete shift now has to be the result of the Plan and Program of Demilitarization, brought along by General Jacques Klein, administrator of the Transitional Administration of UNTAES, and delivered to all the units in that area. What is the meaning of that document, we asked Major General Slavko Baric, deputy commander of the Djakovo Army Corps, and one of the frontmen of the Croatian Government's Office for the Establishment of Croatian Authority in the Occupied Part of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem.

[Baric] General Klein has military, police, and political power in that area, but so far there have been no situations that would put his forces, and also the

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forces of the Serbs, under obligation to fulfill tasks imposed by the administration. The plan has a firm framework, determines the forces, means, and terms when something is to be done. Its importance is also in the fact that one does not wait for the final deployment of the forces, but the existing forces begin carrying out military and police duties, so that from 1 May the Transitional Administration has to function entirely according to the authority it has. We have been waiting for the document, or in military vocabulary, for the command by which the forces will know what to do. So far, this has been more like mutual introduction and searching for lesser activities.

[Vrbosic] As the head of the subcommittee for military issues, you have held several meetings with the opposite side. What are your impressions?

[Baric] The leading people of the Serb side are ready to carry out everything agreed on and everything General Klein orders. Our meetings have been more like attempts to do something before the command itself, and now the Serb side is under the exclusive command of General Klein.

[Vrbosic] Are they aware of what has happened to them?

[Baric] President Milosevic of Serbia has signed the Dayton agreement and said that he would carry out every decision based upon that, and upon Resolution 1037 and UNTAES. The most important thing is that there is that line of agreement, and their army will follow that and will not allow "excursions" of independent groups. Disarmament is voluntary, but it will be carried out based upon the Dayton agreement, the resolution, and General Klein's plan. That is not a traditional military command, because the agreement obliges the opposite side to implement it. There will be north and south subcommittees (Baranja and eastern Slavonia), which after demilitarization will have seven-day control. So, after 37 days, General Klein will submit a report to the Security Council and the UN secretary general, who then decides when the demilitarization is over and when Croatian civilian authorities will be established in that region.

[Vrbosic] At the moment, the most current issue is minesweeping on the superhighway and the Vinkovci-Mirkovci railroad. How is it going?

[Baric] The Slovak Engineer Battalion has surveyed the entire area, and by 1 May both sides have to submit all their minefield maps. Then, a detailed minesweeping plan will be made, particularly for the demarcation zone where, in a belt 1-4 kilometers wide, and 70 kilometers long, there are about 350,000 mines. The minutes about this large number of mines have not been made, and that is one of the main problems.

Based upon the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and Serbia on opening communications, we have already started to sweep mines from the area. Our engineers have participated in minesweeping the superhighway, and the Slovak battalion has only supervised the operation. They are satisfied, but the traffic will be safe for civilians only when 15 meters on both sides and the access roads are clear. We have a promise that this will also be done, and General Klein has also announced that he would open the road next week in the presence of and with a high-level meeting between Croatia and Yugoslavia. That will be the first place where the Croatian police will arrive to the eastern state border.

[Vrbosic] The Croatian police will come to the very border near Bajakovo, so, behind currently occupied Lipovac? Are those not going to be joint police forces?

[Baric] It is normal that there will be joint police forces on one part of the border, but this part is specific. There is neither a Serb population nor villages along the superhighway, and border crossing means more to the UNTAES forces and for the international traffic than to the Serbs, because they use other crossings to go to Serbia. It is a question now whether our policemen will wear our insignia, but our police and our customs office will be there. In the beginning they will most probably wear UNTAES insignia, but they will apply Croatian regulations.

[Vrbosic] Has the Serb side agreed to such an outcome?

[Baric] There are no dilemmas. Yugoslavia has done all the preliminary work, erected buildings and constructed infrastructure for that border crossing in Batrovci.

[Vrbosic] Is it not in fact the first concrete move toward peaceful reintegration of the occupied Croatian east?

[Baric] We must be aware that reintegration is a process. It will in no case happen that on a certain date and at a certain time people simply go to their homes, but they will go gradually and where security preconditions have been created.

For Lipovac we will request that the Slovak engineers carry out a complete check of the place, determine how many mines there are, particularly booby traps, in every house, and every yard, and only after we receive their report, will the population come. It has been agreed that first our damage assessment experts will enter to prepare the reconstruction plan, and after the Slovak battalion has completed its job, people would arrive in the morning and leave in the evening. The Ministry of

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Reconstruction and Development would simultaneously send building material for the companies that participate in the reconstruction. Lipovac would have to serve as a project and a confirmation of how capable Croatia is of returning those people quickly. There will be no major problems; however, Lipovac has been devastated, and the process of return will be conditioned precisely by reconstruction of the electrical and water supply networks.

[Vrbosic] Minesweeping is being carried out by HV members. One UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] officer has recently said on TV that it was too dangerous for his men, and the Serbs, it seems, are not sweeping their own minefields, but the HV does it, too.

[Baric] Minesweeping demands a high level of expertise and equipment. The mines scattered freely mostly belonged to the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and foreign engineers have not met with that type of mines, and the accuracy of the minefield maps is also questionable. The engineers of the Djakovo Army Corps have mineswept thousands and thousands of square kilometers in western Slavonia and have had neither losses nor damages; they are well prepared and qualified, so that we have had no losses on this railroad and road.

The Serb side thinks they will leave it anyway, and they are neither as qualified nor well equipped to do it. Their minefields have not been regularly checked, they are overgrown, and that is a really complex job. True, we have some indications that they will do that job, but I do not know whether it is only a statement. Now, we are demanding that the Slovak battalion not show up only to check, but also to join us in minesweeping. Regarding the area and the number of mines, the most important thing is to clear the communications, settlements, and important buildings, and it is certain that the process will last another four to five years.

[Vrbosic] The Ministry of Reconstruction and Development should be in charge of the minesweeping organization, by founding a civil company for that job. Allegedly, as many as 700 persons have applied for job in that company?

[Baric] After every war the problem of mines is unbelievably huge, and all the countries have had specialized civilian companies for that job. Thus on 1 March the Law on Minesweeping was passed, as well as the decision on establishing a special company within the Ministry where a number of demobilized soldier-engineers would be employed, after additional training. We insist that the company or its part be founded in Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem County, because, after an opinion survey, a large number of people in that region were interested in that job. Since the company has been registered, I expect it to start operating next week, but we are already prepared to perform the job of sweeping mines.

Minesweeping is an extremely expensive process, because we talk about sensitive detectors, vehicles, and protection utensils, and it is a big area. According to world standards, an engineer should not work more than five hours, and in that period he can check 80 square meters. We primarily expect help in financial donations for the purchase of that equipment. We know that $10 million has been obtained, and we expect $20 million from the World Bank, but, some other financial institutions are also interested.

There is a lot of pressure from German, French, and British companies, which offer their services and charge $2.50 per square meter. They think we are not ready for the job and are trying to get that money somehow. I am aware that in the world there are well equipped and trained companies, but we must engage our means and give jobs to our people, and not leave it to somebody else. On one occasion, during such negotiations, we said that we would give some space to foreign companies, but, when they have their job finished, we wanted the company's director to have a walk through that area and to guarantee that the area is cleared of mines. Nobody applied for the job. Therefore, we must not be late with further preparations, particularly because the largest part of those means will be provided by foreign financial institutions. This does not mean that we want to stop minesweeping, or that we are not interested in doing it as quickly as possible, but we are ready to do it ourselves as quickly, as well, and even more thoroughly.

[Vrbosic] Has the process of demilitarization, conditionally said, already started in the occupied territory?

[Baric] When after Operation Storm the front line started to calm down again, one had to reduce the number of people under arms for economic reasons. There is a much smaller number of people under arms at the moment, than earlier.

[Vrbosic] Can you be more specific?

[Baric] We can assume that they have had some 15,000 men under arms. Now I do not believe they have more than 3-4,000, and a bit more police, so that there is no danger from their military activities. The process of demobilization over the last couple of months is the beginning of demilitarization, and a part of the forces, still under command as regular forces, can very quickly be disbanded, in particular because one knows their strength, locations, and warehouses. We know that there

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is a number of people who will try to keep their weapons any way they can. In certain places they have already buried their weapons, but that will not be a major problem, because the control will be more restrictive where the Serb population now forms the majority.

[Vrbosic] Have the heavy weapons already been transported to Serbia?

[Baric] There are almost no heavy arms on the front line. The artillery exists within 5-6 kilometers; it is put under protection on the positions, and with the crews to maintain it. The better and more contemporary arms have been transported to Serbia. Some of them have remained, but nothing significant. It is important that there are no bigger formations from Yugoslavia, but only forces from that region.

[Vrbosic] According to the Plan and Program of Demilitarization, other military equipment is also to be collected.

[Baric] The plan envisages the destruction of arms. To be frank, I am not sure that all the weapons should be destroyed, because the Croatian state and its people have paid for the major part of it. When we establish Croatian authorities there, we will try to prevent a large-scale destruction of all equipment, because within the system of the HV organization, there will be units which are to be armed in that area. All other equipment (vehicles, communications equipment) used by the Army and the police will be put at General Klein's disposal, and he will decide what does not have to be destroyed.

[Vrbosic] It is an ungrateful task to forecast deadlines, but will the demilitarization be finished by June, as is being forecast now?

[Baric] The process of demilitarization should start on 6 May. However, even if there are some problems, that deadline cannot be moved further than 31 May.

[Vrbosic] You say "cannot." What do you base it upon?

[Baric] I base it upon the plan presented by General Klein. So, that is the final date. According to our knowledge, the process should start between 10 and 15 May, and finish after 30 days. If one adds those seven days of checking, it means that the final term is 7 July 1996. According to all agreements, the process of demilitarization cannot be finished later than that, with all the reserves and possibilities that the other side is dragging. We envisage 16 June as the optimal date.

I point out that demilitarization has its own laws, so that every violation of deadlines does not mean that the other side is guilty, particularly because the Croatian side demands maximal guarantees for the safety of the return. The first stage of demilitarization started two days ago, by removing obstacles on Biljska road, Nemetin, and Nustar. The other side has been given a task to remove all the obstacles so that the communications would be free for the movement of UNTAES forces, without being stopped or checked. In the second stage the destruction of a part of fortifications along the front line would begin, as well as collecting arms, ammunition, and equipment. The last stage is the check of what is done, solving possible points for discussion, that is, composing a report for the UN Secretary General, who will submit his report to the Security Council, and then, Croatian civic authorities can be introduced.

[Vrbosic] Klein's plan envisages that the UNTAES members can search houses, stop vehicles, and arrest persons who resist?

[Baric] UNTAES forces observe the process in the way that they can enter all buildings, search vehicles, persons, and buildings, but can also put people under temporary arrest and punish them. We have insisted that, if the process of disarmament is voluntary, then the check cannot be outside the system. If after 30 days weapons and military equipment are found with someone, UNTAES can put him under arrest and process him.

[Vrbosic] Is the HV, to speed up the process, ready for certain concessions regarding its deployment?

[Baric] Those are not concessions, but complete withdrawal is proposed on both sides of the demarcation line, and UNTAES forces should be in-between. That is being considered and I think it will be accepted, and there is no reason for fear that the opposite side could do anything bad.

[Vrbosic] What do you think about the changes at the head of the Serb negotiating team and the return of the "early guerrilla fighters"?

[Baric] It is hard to tell what those changes will mean. If those changes have been done to speed this process up and to put everything under closer control, then it is perfectly all right. However, there is something fishy about it. These are Serb "early guerrilla fighters," but they left the area and the people in 1992-93. If those people are being accepted back into the same population, then that is their problem. We will make no concessions. We know what every one of them has done. There is hard evidence; however, we do not have to speculate about that. In some 10 days we will see what this new team wants. For the time being, we do not want to impose anyone, nor will we refuse talks, but we will not let the process stop or prolong itself.

Croatia has proved that also as a military force it wants and it can solve this question in a peaceful way. That is

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the proof of our strength, so that we do not have to have secret intentions in the process of reintegration, although we are aware that there is another way of solving this which grants 100 percent success. For the first time we can make compromises and allow the opposite side some things which we earlier could not or would not allow. We can accept their suggestions, but that does not mean departure from the process and deadlines. There have been problems in the talks with the Serb representatives so far, so that one should not think that these new ones will radically change their stands.

[Vrbosic] How many people will wait for the Croatian authorities in that region?

[Baric] I sincerely hope that those who have not violated Croatian laws will stay. I am aware that a large number of them has been in that Army; however, participation in an army does not mean pressing charges, unless they participated in crimes. The current relation of the Serbs toward the remaining Croats and Hungarians is also important. We do not want the Serbs to leave that region and there is no reason to fear that Croatian authorities will be very repressive. The criminals had better leave before we come, but those against whom charges have been brought have already left, or they are slowly packing their things, because they know what they have done.

[Box, p 10]

What Serbs Should Do

[Vrbosic] Minesweeping is a complex process, but demilitarization seems to be an even bigger problem. Has Klein also asked to be given precise data on the military units, armament, and deployment of forces by 1 May?

[Baric] The HV does not submit a report on the deployment of its forces, but the Serbs should give a detailed list and a deployment plan for their army, warehouses, armament, and equipment. Based upon that all military, paramilitary, police, and other forces one can find over there will be disbanded, under UNTAES control. Collection and destruction of armament is also envisaged, including even hunting shotgun shells.

[Box, p 11]

Our Insignia From July

[Vrbosic] It is obvious that the Croatian civilian authorities should step into the occupied territory in July, but when will the HV come to the Danube river?

[Baric] In some way, it will happen at the same moment when the civilian authorities do, because then it will be all the same whether we were on the Drava or on the Danube. The HV will enter that area, and the final deadline is two years. Our police will be there as early as this year, with UNTAES insignia, during the period of demilitarization, and as early as July-August we can expect our insignia in that territory.

[Vrbosic] Is this something new?

[Baric] Yes, that is the agreement. Joint forces will wear UNTAES insignia during the process of demilitarization, and that means throughout these two months. It is important to us that very soon the laws of the Republic of Croatia will be applied, and that our public institutions enter that region. Common people are aware what they will win with the arrival of Croatian authorities over there. Their salaries now amount to some 100 German marks [DM], pensions DM20-30, labor is paid DM15-20 a week, there is no production and no living standard at all.

[Box, p 11]

They Swam Over to Croatia

[Vrbosic] Is there any Serb sabotage?

[Baric] Recently, we have had neither indications, nor attempts at sabotage, which, of course, does not mean that we are less cautious. There is always the possibility of only individual actions, which are very hard to prevent, and there where everything is liberated and the authorities function completely. There is no reason for more fear here than elsewhere.

[Vrbosic] Are there incidents now at the demarcation line?

[Baric] No. There were only two crossings of the Drava River. A couple of days ago one Serb swam over the river near Josipovac, and the other one near Podgajci, and they surrendered to our forces. Regarding the way the system over there functions, one can expect a lot more of that.

Croatia: Article Details Security Service Scandals

AU0205091996 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 pp 3-4

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "After Miroslav Tudjman's and Gojko Susak's Visit to Siroki Brijeg, HVO Colonel Ante Gugic and Another Two Hundred New Agents, Mostly Herzegovinians, Were Brought to the SIS Administration in Zagreb!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Late in February, a general mobilization was announced in the SIS (Security-Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense). The

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reason for the alert was not to get involved again with the rebel Serbs, or an unstable security situation between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or a threat to the personal security of some high official at the Ministry, or the campaign against the Serbian agents among the Croats. The reason for it all was a document, which at the time former SIS officers had first given to the representatives at the parliament, and then—since the representatives, including several serious opposition champions, did not want to let the general public know about it—finally handed over to journalists.

It is, of course, the famous petition of the two SIS majors and a colonel which contains numerous compromising documents marked secret and which accuses certain, and now demoted, Croatian security service officers of crime, negligence, and eavesdropping on leading Croatian statesmen and politicians, opposition members and journalists. This also included both Josip Manolic and Josip Boljkovac, who, when they were wiretapped in 1991, were discharging their duties as prime minister and minister of police.

It is particularly interesting that the former SIS officers claim that President Tudjman in person ordered them to compose that document about the scandals at the Ministry of Defense.

"We did not stop them, we enabled them to publish it because, wishing to respect the democratic organization of Croatia, we were utterly helpless. We could only have arrested them, thus causing a political scandal that would not be at all useful to Croatia," according to one of the high SIS officials, with whom we talked two weeks ago.

After publishing the petition, Zagreb political, military, and police circles considered that this file was deliberately released to the public in order to compromise the competitive agency, the police Service for the Protection of Constitutional Order (SZUP), because it was obvious from the document that the SZUP itself had been carrying out illegal wiretapping and that some of the intelligence officers seriously compromised by those documents are, in fact, police officers.

In view of the fact that Minister of Defense Gojko Susak is one of the fiercest political adversaries of Minister of Police Ivan Jarnjak, such interpretations seem logical.

However, apart from the GLOBUS collocutor from the top of SIS, one more source close to Croatia's intelligence center claims that in the first two months of this year, there was complete chaos at SIS and that the military counterintelligence service was entirely powerless to prevent the release of the petition.

"You can never imagine what was going on in SIS at that time. They had no control over their men or their documents. Almost everybody had physical access to the SIS Administration, even without special personal identification! One of the heads of SIS until February this year was a man, let us say, of poor mental abilities, who behaved extremely irresponsibly. The SIS budget is almost unlimited. It has an enormous quantity of cash, which is normal cinsidering the nature of the job."

Instead of Closing Down, Reorganization of SIS

"That man, in a very high position, has spent a lot of SIS money in the last two years, and he has never submitted one receipt to the SIS Administration," the second GLOBUS collocutor claims, and continues to say: "For this confused situation in SIS, Dr. Goran Dodig, once director of SIS, is probably also responsible. During his mandate the scandal regarding drug trafficking was revealed when one of the high officers of SIS, who fortunately no longer works at the Ministry of Defense, was caught trafficking. I do not want to say that Dodig has anything to do with it. On the contrary, he is an utterly fair and honest man, but at SIS they think that he was too soft and has not managed to organize the Service effectively."

Allegedly because of the chaotic situation at SIS, the culmination of which was the scandalous petition of its three former officers, the chief of all Croatian intelligence services, Dr. Miroslav Tudjman, has decided to carry out radical changes.

First, he has seriously considered closing SIS and creating a new, much more efficient, service. But the Croatian state leadership has very soon given up that radical, but at the time quite logical suggestion.

Then, the decision to reorganize was made. Colonel Ante Gugic, who has partially succeeded in reducing crime, disrespect for hierarchy, and large-scale smuggling in the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units in Herzegovina, was brought to Zagreb into the SIS Administration, as early as six months ago!

After the scandal in February, Colonel Gugic was authorized by Miroslav Tudjman and Gojko Susak to take over a major part of operative duties in the SIS.

Has General Blaskic Tried To Escape?

Colonel Ante Gugic is subordinated, of course, to the structural chief of SIS, to a real war veteran and passionate spearfisher, Markica Rebic, also a close associate of Tudjman's—but he also has large independent authorities.

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There is one curiosity regarding Gugic: Allegedly, a couple of days before his departure to The Hague, General Tihomir Blaskic got in his car and set off in the direction of Samobor and the Slovenian border. It was a lovely, sunny Sunday. The SIS, presumably wishing to show that the situation in the service had radically changed, urgently notified its patrols to search for General Blaskic. At SIS they thought that Blaskic wanted to get out of Croatia and avoid going to the International War Crimes Tribunal.

On that Sunday afternoon the roads between Zagreb, Samobor, and Bregana were blocked, and all the important officials were sitting at their desks.

In the late afternoon, General Blaskic, having noticed many patrols and realizing what had happened, telephoned Colonel Ante Gugic, convinced him that he had no intention of avoiding the Habue Tribunal, and returned to Zagreb by himself. SIS was relieved.

Apart from Gugic, who discharges the majority of operative duties at SIS, another HVO officer from Herzegovina, whose ethical and professional features are also described in superlatives, has recently arrived in Zagreb.

Apart from the personnel changes at the highest level, there is a purge being carried out right now among the lower level employees in the Security Intelligence Service.

Miroslav Tudjman Among Franciscans

That means that many officers and soldiers of the old, almost closed and shattered SIS, are being fired, and that new people, whom Miroslav Tudjman and Gojko Susak consider worthy of their confidence, are being hired.

Allegedly, over the last two months, more than 200 new people have been employed at the Security Intelligence Service. Many of them come from Herzegovina!

While Minister of Defense Gojko Susak has been recuperating at Siroki Brijeg over the last 10 days, Dr. Miroslav Tudjman has also spent a couple of days with him in Herzegovina.

Although Tudjman is a declared atheist, Tudjman and Susak together have visited the Franciscan monasteries of the Assumption of Mary. Besides visiting monasteries, Miroslav Tudjman and Gojko Susak have spent a lot of time drafting lists of new personnel for SIS.

Dr. Miroslav Tudjman, the most popular member of the president's family, returned very satisfied to Zagreb: He has succeeded in the almost complete reconstruction of the military counterintelligence service.

Who Are "Irresponsible Individuals"?

Simultaneously, along with personnel, there was a technical reorganization in the service, too.

This second level of radical changes at SIS comprises the introduction of a very restrictive technical and physical control of everything going on at the Administration. Concretely, everything going on at SIS now is being visually and voice recorded. The access to the information and to the very premises of the SIS Administration has been seriously limited; documents, like those published in the famous petition, are accessible only to a small number of employees.

The reorganization of SIS has essentially influenced the whole of Croatia's intelligence community, which lists six separate services: the Seventh Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Intelligence Administration of the Ministry of Defense; SIS (counterintelligence department of the Ministry of Defense); the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order of the Ministry of Police; the Croatian Intelligence Institution founded by young Tudjman himself; and the supreme agency, the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Order, at the head of which is, only nominally, the parliamentary representative from Metkovic, Luka Bebic.

The main change currently going on in Croatia's intelligence-security system is the essential diminishing of influence of the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order—compromised by the accusations of unauthorized wiretapping of politicians and journalists—on behalf of SIS.

Smiljan Reljic Is Not Leaving!

In the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order itself, we have been told, however, that SZUP and SIS have very good cooperation, and that the problems occur only because of irresponsible individuals, of which there are many in SIS, but also in SZUP, and that the authorities of those two services have been clearly divided.

In SZUP they resolutely deny the news from circles close to the top of the Ministry of Defense, saying that the head of SZUP, Smiljan Reljic, will soon be removed from the office that he has now held for four years.

It is, however, a fact that the politicians close to the Ministry of Defense have been trying to take over major positions at the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] for a long time. Reljic's departure would mark the removal of one of the last overt Susak and Vukojevic opponents from Croatia's security system. If Reljic leaves, Minister Ivan Jarnjak will remain surrounded by only a couple

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of loyal associates and politically he will be much more vulnerable than so far.

The big question is whether or not Jarnjak will be able to withstand the strikes of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] right wing and attempts by Susak's and Vukojevic's people to remove him.

The strongest argument of the right wing has so far been the scandal over the unauthorized wiretapping of politicians and journalists, for which, allegedly, the SZUP is responsible.

The SZUP claims that the materials published in the articles about the scandal are not authentic and has prepared a document of some 30 pages, marked state secret, about the activities of the SZUP in 1995. That document, composed in three major chapters, will soon be presented to the Parliamentary Committee for National Security.

At the closed-door session of the Committee, the head of SZUP, Smiljan Reljic, will hand over copies of that document to all the members, among whom, of course, there are opposition politicians. After reading the document however, they will have to return the copies to him. That document, the people from SZUP claim, contains precise and complete data on all the essential activities of the Service, including wiretapping.

In the SZUP they think that this document will prove that MUP intelligence officers have been operating in line with constitutional authorization and that one will not be able to use the wiretapping of politicians as an argument for the toppling of Smiljan Reljic and for a final assault on Minister Ivan Jarnjak.

The big purge in SIS, controlled not only by Minister Susak and his closest associates, but also Miroslav Tudjman himself, and which has been caused by the disintegration of the system after the publication of the petition by the three former SIS officers, has far-reaching security and political importance.

And while Dr. Miroslav Tudjman is mostly interested in strengthening Croatia's security system, simultaneously the political structure of the intelligence services has been definitely changed by bringing a series of successful and uncompromised new officers to SIS, mostly from Herzegovina.

Now, almost all of them are under the strong political influence of Gojko Susak, and the collocutors of GLOBUS from the Ministry of Defense claim that soon also SZUP will come under the political control of the most powerful minister of Croatia.

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Poland: 2 Police Officers Injured in May Day Demonstration

LD0105115596 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1114 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Krakow, 1 May—A dozen or so participants in a demonstration organized by the Republican League, in which about 350 people took part, were detained by police in the Krakow district of Planty. The demonstrators formed a parade and started throwing smoke bombs at the fenced-off area where the members and sympathizers of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic were holding their 1 May meeting. The right-wing sympathizers attempted to force their way through the barriers. The police used truncheons. During the incident, two policemen were injured, assistant inspector Jozef Gawlik, the spokesman for the KWP [Provincial Police Command] in Krakow, told PAP.

Gawlik said that police prevention subunits were used in the operation. He said that, after the initial questioning, those arrested would be released. However, prosecution cases will be submitted to misdemeanor courts against the organizers of the unauthorized demonstration in Planty. I regret to say that Krakow city councillors also took part in that demonstration, Gawlik said. [passage omitted]

Poland: SdRP Chairman Oleksy Addresses May Day Rally

LD0105121396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The May Day rally in Warsaw was addressed by trade union leaders and representatives of the political groupings taking part in the demonstration. Jozef Oleksy, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], was among them:

[Begin recording] [Oleksy] The left, including Poland's left, is firmly standing by its chief attributes. We shall not hesitate to tell our own government what to do better and faster and with an attitude more eager and more sensitive to what millions of people who have placed their hopes in the left are expecting.

[Correspondent Bozena Falkowska] When the rally was coming to an end, counterdemonstrators carrying firecrackers again appeared among those taking part in the rally. Police intervened again. As I am now reporting to you, Grzybowski Square [center of Warsaw] is empty. Only small groups of people have remained, who are slowly heading for home. [end recording]

Poland: Kwasniewski Explains Nonattendance at May Day Parade

LD0105163196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1509 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 1 May—"No May Day parade staged by either the left wing or the right wing should be disrupted," President Aleksander Kwasniewski told correspondents when asked to comment on today's disturbances during celebrations marking 1 May in Poland. The president invited about 200 people representing employers, employees, trades unions, and the government to a picnic on the presidential palace grounds.

Kwasniewski is of the opinion that it is normal that people in Poland have different views about May Day, but throwing firecrackers can no longer be classified as being normal and should be condemned.

The president, when he explained why he had not taken part in the march staged by the Democratic Left Alliance and the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, said that, because of the post he holds, he did not wish to be put in a situation where he had to choose to which parade he would or would not go. This is why he decided that the best thing to do would be to hold a May Day celebration in the palace gardens.

According to Kwasniewski, those backing the left wing understood his decision perfectly well. The president expressed the conviction that those on the left do not harbor any doubts that his stance as regards this political option remains honest and unalterable.

Commenting on the fact that representatives of Solidarity did not turn up for the picnic, despite having been invited, Kwasniewski said: "I am a patient man, and I will be inviting them next year."

Poland: Rosati Thinks NATO Should Explain Aims to Moscow

LD0105222596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 2200 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After returning from his trip to Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati said that at present there was no external threat to Poland and that if such a situation continued there would be no need to deploy nuclear weapons on our territory. The Polish foreign minister warned, however, that individual negotiations with NATO on the subject of our joining this organization had still not begun and that it would be difficult to say in advance what Poland's final decision would be in this matter. Rosati thinks the alliance should be conducting an active dialogue with Moscow so as to explain to it that NATO is a democratic organization

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incapable of aggression. However, in the minister's opinion, all Poland should do is inform Russia about our aspirations and efforts as regards NATO.

Poland: Minister Urges Increased Use of Natural Gas

WS0105131396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Gas supplement) in Polish 25 Apr 96 p I

[Interview with Klemens Scierski, Polish minister of industry and trade, by Beata E. Nawracka; place and date not given: "A Green Light for Gas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nawracka] The primary goals of the state's policy are to accelerate the pace of economic growth and increase Poland's competitiveness in the context of integration with the EU. How can this be translated into practical language for the fuel and power-engineering sector?

[Scierski] First of all, in the long run this will require a reliable supply of energy and at least a good condition for power-engineering companies; otherwise they will simply not meet consumer demand and the rules of competition. "The Tenets of Poland's Power-Engineering Policy Until the Year 2010" are adjusted to the realities of the market economy and thus do not define specific tasks or solutions for separate companies. The "Tenets" outline primary goals and tasks of the sector as a whole.

It is clear that both the program for reforms in the power-engineering sector and their pace must take into account acceptance by both society and the sector itself. This will require appropriate prices for energy sources and a relevant taxation policy for power-engineering companies. This entails the need to adjust legal regulations to the new situation, which should result in increased interest of domestic and foreign capital in investing in our power-engineering sector. In areas in which market activities are restricted or impossible, companies' operations will be stimulated by an independent regulatory body (the Power-Engineering Regulation Office—URE).

One should also remember that activities in the fuel and power-engineering sector must correspond to the state environmental policy and, first of all, to the basic rule of this policy—structural changes aimed at the maximum savings during the process of producing and consuming power.

[Nawracka] In addition to oil and coal, natural gas is an energy source that is playing an increasingly important role in the world's economy. What is the situation in Poland in this regard?

[Scierski] Concern over safety of power engineering has brought about increased interest in raw materials whose share in the balance of primary fuels was previously insignificant. In turn, environmental norms and economic estimates and growth have caused increased consumption of natural gas and oil as a condition for technological and civilizational progress.

In the 1980's, consumption of natural gas increased to 1.4 trillion cubic meters, and in 1994 it reached 2.2 trillion cubic meters, which currently accounts for 24 percent of produced primary energy. In West European countries, it was approximately 300 billion cubic meters or 18.3 percent.

In 1994, consumption of natural gas in Poland reached 9.6 billion cubic meters and currently accounts for as little as 8.6 percent of used primary energy. So there is still much to be done in this area, all the more so because the expected increase in demand for energy in Poland will reach 40 percent in the communal sector alone. Currently, only 12 percent of houses are using gas heat.

[Nawracka] Given the current level of gas extraction worldwide, the current deposits will be enough for another 68 years. What does this mean for Poland?

[Scierski] All over the world, natural gas is becoming an increasingly available type of fuel, and in the next few years, it may be used to a greater extent in Poland as well. The expected demand for gas in Poland in the year 2010 is assessed at 22-27 billion cubic meters, so it will be twice as high as it is now.

Owing to the more intensive use of gas in power engineering, it will be possible to reduce emission of dust by 250,000 tonnes, emission of sulfur dioxide by 600,000 tonnes, and emission of nitrogen oxides by 170,000 tonnes. One does not have to explain what effect this will have on the environment.

The temporary lower demand for energy in our country can be used to modernize power engineering facilities, to adjust them to the environmental norms, and to improve their efficiency and durability. It is necessary to constantly improve technologies of obtaining, processing, delivering, and using energy to reduce environmental pollution and the costs of processing primary energy into final energy used by consumers. One should expect that new deposits will be discovered, which in practice will mean that there will be enough gas for more than 68 years.

[Nawracka] Although we currently do not experience shortages of power and electricity, this is mainly thanks to lower demand. The expected economic growth, however, sets increasingly higher goals for Polish power engineering....

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[Scierski] This will evidently require building new storage and regular power stations, as well as wider use of natural gas. It is expected that natural gas will be used mainly in peak-load and steam-gas generating units.

Because the possible annual extraction of domestic gas is estimated at 4.6 billion cubic meters until the year 2010, it will be necessary to import gas to meet demand fully.

There is no doubt, however, that coal and lignite will remain the primary energy sources in our country during this period.

[Nawracka] It is important for the country's power-engineering security to ensure deliveries of raw materials from various independent sources. Russia is currently our main supplier of natural gas. Does this not pose a threat of becoming too dependent on one supplier?

[Scierski] Independently of the current deliveries of Russian gas according to the existing agreements and negotiations on deliveries through the transit gas pipeline from Russia to Western Europe—the so-called great pipeline—talks with Western firms are being conducted. We are conducting talks on deliveries of natural gas from the Northern Sea deposits via Denmark and the Baltic Sea or via Germany, and we are also considering deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

We are thinking about increased deliveries of gas through the Western gas system. We have two connections with the German system: one located near Swinoujscie, with a capacity of 60 million cubic meters per year, and the other in Zgorzelec, which makes it possible to receive up to 1.5 billion cubic meters annually. Connections with other systems may give us an additional 5 billion cubic meters of gas annually in the future. We are estimating that deliveries of LNG could account for a few billion cubic meters annually.

The storage of gas is also an important element. We currently have reservoirs with an operating capacity of 700 million cubic meters, and we lease additional reservoirs, with a capacity of 350 million cubic meters, in Ukraine and Belarus. This is definitely not enough. By the year 2010, we must construct additional facilities with a total capacity of 4 billion cubic meters. This is currently the main goal in order to improve our security with regard to the gas supply.

[Nawracka] Thank you for the conversation.

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Romania: Kiev Invited To Jointly Build Nuclear Plant

WS0205080696 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0750 GMT 2 May 96

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As a UKRINFORM correspondent in Bucharest, Romania, reported, the "VOCA ROUMINIEJ" newspaper wrote an item to the above effect with reference to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko's statement. As the Romanian newspaper reminds its readers, Romania sent messages to Moldova and to Ukraine offering these nations to financially join Romania's Cerna Voda nuclear power plant construction project, as likely to benefit the region's nations, when materialized. As VOCA R[illegible]MINIEJ specifies, Ukraine has been the object of international pressure for closing down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which Kiev has pledged to dismantle by the year 2000, if property is supported by the West's financial resources. Relevant international funds are supposed to cover expenses involving the Chernobyl nuclear power plant's close-down and those involving Ukraine's imports of electric power and/or construction of alternative power facilities.

Romania: PD Leader Roman Withdraws Proposal on PFP

AU0105175196 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a news conference held last night in the town of Resita, Petre Roman [Democratic Party president and presidential candidate on behalf of the Social-Democratic Union] stated that he had withdrawn his proposal about the institutionalization of NATO's Partnership for Peace [PFP] program, but that he has not changed his views on that issue.

He made that statement in reply to the ROMPRES correspondent's question asking the Democratic Party [PD] leader to comment on the news in which NATO Secretary General Javier Solana appreciates his initiative.

Petre Roman pointed out that he will come up with that idea again when the right time comes, probably after Romania is nominated as a would-be NATO member, and he explained that he had withdrawn his proposal, due to the fact that the latter is being used for electoral maneuvers against him.

Furthermore, the PD president mentioned the fact that his proposal was intended as an alternative, a new organization formula for the PFP, as a response to Russia's negative reaction with respect to NATO's eastward expansion. Roman added that initiatives on the security of the continent may also come from Central and East European countries.

The PD leader then said that he might discuss details directly with the NATO secretary general, who on 3 May is scheduled to arrive in Bucharest, and with whom he believes he will meet, reports the ROMPRES news agency.

Romania: Democratic Party Backs Roman's View on NATO

AU0105165196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 26 Apr 96 p 5

[Communique issued by the Democratic Party Press Office; place and date not given: "The PDSR Cannot Rid Itself of the Bad Habits of the Past"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The communique issued by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] Press Office regarding the speech made by Petre Roman at the 18-21 April NATO Defense College session in Rome represents yet another scandalous proof of the malevolence and false propaganda to which the PDSR resorts in its political activity. Bad habits of the past, when propaganda and falsehood was used to cover up reality, continue to be present in the political mentality of the PDSR. Despite the fact that, in the said communique, they maim Mr. Petre Roman's speech, it is still very obvious that the proposal he made there referred to "the relations between NATO and the countries that are not NATO members in the Euro-Asian region," which makes it clear from the very beginning that he set out from the incontestable assumption that Romania is to join NATO, which is to expand in Eastern Europe rather than in the Euro-Asian region.

In the speech made by Petre Roman during the session of the NATO Defense College, the idea of any alternative solutions to NATO expansion do not appear in any way, an idea which, however, repeatedly crops up in the political discourse of the PDSR government's defense minister, who makes remarks such as "It would not be a catastrophe if Romania did not join NATO."

The PDSR Press Office insinuates that Petre Roman's proposal "could be considered" as an alternative solution to NATO enlargement, which is nothing but a gross falsification to suit their interests, because the words "could be considered" are based solely on the incorrect accusations formulated in their communique.

The truth is that Petre Roman forwarded a political initiative, the goal of which was and still remains to offer a concrete answer to the obvious necessity that cooperation should be set forth between an enlarged NATO

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and the countries that are not to become members, such as Russia and Ukraine.

As a matter of fact, during the entire symposium in Rome, and especially during the debates that followed Mr. Roman's speech, on which occasion the PDSR representative did not utter a single word, the participants expressed their appreciation for Petre Roman's activity and contributions.

It is known that the Partnership for Peace [PFP], which was initiated by U.S. President Bill Clinton, is a program intended to install a climate of confidence throughout Europe and which was successful especially in cooperation in the military field.

Petre Roman presented in detail the numerous successful actions undertaken by our country within the PFP. It is quite significant that the largest part of Mr. Roman's speech—the subject of which "The PFP and NATO Enlargement" was established by the organizers of the event—consisted of a reference specifying Romania's option to join NATO, the fact that the population supports that option, and Romania's numerous and considerable achievements in that domain.

The essential suggestion made by Petre Roman refers to the enlargement and institutionalization of the PFP program, this being intended to achieve efficient cooperation in the domain of combating new threats to European security, perils that NATO itself defined as organized crime, terrorist acts, smuggling of weapons, as well as radioactive substances and materials, and smuggling persons over borders.

NATO considers the strengthening of the PFP as a priority, which is due to the very good results achieved so far in the building up of confidence among various armies, which until not long ago used to belong to adverse camps and compelled to be at war with one another during the Cold War.

Russia's obstinate opposition to NATO enlargement, a fact that is not even mentioned in the PDSR press communique, is accompanied by the proposal permanently made by that country to set up a unique institution responsible for European security, within the framework of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], (...) which would include and thus dominate both NATO and the PFP.

Petre Roman's suggestion to strengthen the PFP, to which Russia also belongs, may be considered as a reply to the urges of the Russian Federation to the favor of the OSCE as an organization superposed to NATO.

The PDSR communique does not even try to mimic a dignified stance of Romanian diplomacy on the issue. Romania's prospects as a future member, to situate itself on the same footing with other NATO members, means above all that it should participate by having initiatives and displaying responsibility, in the entire process of establishing European security, in which NATO, as Mr. Roman asserted, represents a guarantee that new democracies, including our country, will follow their path on their own free will.

No well-intended person could doubt that Petre Roman's entire activity dedicated to achieving closer relations with the West was intended to ensure Romania's admittance into NATO. This can be seen by the actions he undertook as prime minister as early as in May and June 1990 when he established the first contact with the then NATO secretary general, Mr. Manfred Woerner.

Petre Roman was the first government head of a former Warsaw Pact country to be officially received at NATO headquarters. That was in October 1990. The successful establishment in 1994 of the National Consultative Council for Romania's Euro-Atlantic Integration was also an initiative of the Democratic Party and Petre Roman.

Petre Roman's recent election as special rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly—he being the sole representative of Central Europe on the subcommittee for "NATO Enlargement and the New European Democracies"—emphasizes his authority on the issue. The PDSR may or may not choose to display a stance similar to that of beggars but Romania cannot! It is still our strong belief that Romania's fate should be decided on in no other capital city of the world but Bucharest.

Romania: PL '93 Leader Expects Iliescu's Defeat in Elections

AU0105173596 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 27 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with PL '93 President Dinu Patriciu by Andrei Costa; place and date not given: "The Prefect's Offices Have Become Superfluous Bodies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Costa] What kind of strategy will the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93] follow regarding its cooperation with other opposition parties?

[Patriciu] We are absolutely open to any cooperation that could be established among the three doctrine currents within the opposition—the social-democratic, the liberal, and the Christian-democratic one—because it is my belief that together we can govern this country. As far as technical agreements are concerned and in view of the coming elections, it is necessary that we should practically achieve the electoral nonaggression; furthermore, we should cooperate in supervising the ballot boxes and

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the correctness of the elections, together set up majorities in the local and county councils, and, later on, in Parliament; and finally, we should elaborate a joint government program as stipulated by the protocol signed in July 1993 by the opposition parties represented in Parliament.

[Costa] Do you think it is still possible to set up a liberal pole consisting in an alliance of parties that are not members of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]?

[Patriciu] It is my conviction that all the liberals who believe in the same ideas begin to gather under the sign of the "Horse" [PL '93 electoral emblem] for the local elections. After the local elections, I think that all the liberal-oriented persons will feel a strong urge to get together.

[Costa] How are relations between the PL '93 and the CDR?

[Patriciu] Ours is a cooperative relationship out in the territory, in all places where our political groupings consider this necessary.

[Costa] Where do you think President Iliescu's vulnerable points lie, and how could one make use of them to defeat him in the presidential race?

[Patriciu] Mr. Iliescu will be defeated in the presidential race because, first, he has adversaries in the extreme-left camp, who by resorting to demagogic populism have managed to become increasingly strong, and, second, because as in any democratic country, there is a full range of normal political parties represented by the social-democrats, Christian-democrats, and the liberals. Mr. Ion Iliescu's vulnerable points stem from this uncomfortable position of him regarding his mentality and in the extreme-left solutions he suggests, although that wing has been occupied by others. He is continuously trying to change his discourse, but he is unable to alter his political conception. The policy he is currently trying to pursue is to prove that changes did occur over the past four years. However, merely demonstrating that the macroeconomic indicators today are better than in 1992 does not mean anything as long as this increase does not become also visible in the standard of living of the people. I mean, the average [monthly] income in Romania is under $100, whereas in the other countries, which successfully apply the reform, this figure varies between $300 and $500. Now this is the sole thing that genuinely matters. Everything else is unimportant, because Romania has engaged in a very tough competition with the other former socialist countries, a competition in which the countries that chose the slow-pace reform will be defeated. This can be proved by simply comparing the macroeconomic indicators we achieved over the past four years with those of the other countries in the same time period.

[Costa] How could genuine decentralization be promoted in local public administration?

[Patriciu] By the political will of the local public authority, above all, to act autonomously, which is an absolutely essential precondition. If the mayors and the local councils do not expect the government to give them regulations, orders, decrees, or government decisions—and I have to point out that in the past four years the latter were often illegal, violating the Constitution or the Law on Local Public Administration—rather they take their jobs seriously and try to use the laws to better the life of the localities they are running, things will go well. Of course, a leap has to be achieved in the quality of national lawmaking, too, because local autonomy without financial autonomy is sheer nonsense. But even so, the mayors could use extrabudgetary sources if they manage to find and turn them to good account, such as the local councils' assets, their economic exploitation by guaranteeing certain loans, offering loans by selling, letting, or leasing those assets, as well as the much larger field of becoming partners in the private companies, and financial institutions, which could lead to solving the problems of their localities. As far as social protection is concerned, I would say that, as everywhere in this world, the central government coordination of such programs is less important, as local public authorities are able to resolve a great deal of the problems of the unemployed and the economically handicapped groups of persons.

[Costa] What should the status of the public servants be?

[Patriciu] Public servants should be at the service of the citizens. We need to come up with a law on the status of public servants in which their social position could be defined very exactly. In connection with this I believe that the local public authorities ought to be given free hand to establish how much they pay their public servants or the incentives they offer for their good activity. I prefer a body consisting of just a few people, but who are paid very well, to bodies employing armies of people, but whose salaries are very low, so they become corruptible.

[Costa] How do you rate the current performance of the county prefects in their relations with the mayors?

[Patriciu] The prefects, encouraged by the Vacaroiu government, which is suffering from centralism, are trying to act as "county first secretaries" [of the Communist

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Party], and, unfortunately, in many places, they have managed—they have taken over the duties of the county council bodies and those of the local public authorities. Thus, the prefects have become a king of political coordinators in their areas, a kind of overseer sent there by the government, although their constitutional prerogatives merely refer to the observance of the laws. Legally, the prefects have no executive prerogatives whatsoever, and yet the absurd situation was created of their illegally setting up institutions they call prefect's offices, which have already begun accumulating assets and assuming duties as they wish, although normally such things are none of their business. The prefect's offices are absolutely superfluous bodies, which simply waist money and therefore are very expensive for the taxpayers. Due to these reasons, they should vanish, and prefects should become single persons representing the government, period.

Romania: Dohotaru To Head Military Counterintelligence

AU0205150796 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Radu Tudor: "Colonel Ion Dohotaru Is the New Chief of the MApN Counterespionage Directorate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By order of Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca and with the approval of the Supreme Defense Council, Colonel Ion Dohotaru was appointed the new chief of the National Defense Ministry [MApN] Counterintelligence Directorate on 30 April 1996. Colonel Dohotaru was previously the deputy to Division General Dr. Decebal Ilina, chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate. Before 30 April 1996, the office of chief of the MApN Counterintelligence Intelligence was held by Division General Victor Negulescu. As stipulated by Law 80 of 1995 regarding the status of military cadres, General Negulescu retired because he had reached the age limit of 62. Some time ago, he had forwarded his request to be put in reserve to Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca.

The new chief of the MApN Counterintelligence Directorate is experienced in intelligence work.

Dohotaru was born on 14 August 1941 in Bucharest. In 1973 he graduated from the Chinese-language section of the Classic Roman and Oriental Languages Department [of Bucharest University].

He finished his military training in 1974 at the Military School of Reserve Officers. In 1982, he graduated from a postgraduate military intelligence course, and in 1993 he finished his studies at the Superior College for Chiefs of Staff at the Academy of High Military Studies. He was first promoted on 11 July 1975 to captain, while his last promotion was on 25 October 1990 to colonel.

Before 1979, he was assigned to the office of the Romanian military attache in the People's Republic of China. He was then promoted to the General Chief of Staff, where he served as officer 2, officer 1, and bureau chief within the Military Intelligence Directorate.

On 23 July 1991, he was appointed deputy to the chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate.

He speaks Chinese, French, English, and Russian. He is married and has one child. His wife's name is Marina and his daughter, Maria Cristina, attends high school.

Colonel Ion Dohotaru's nature is calm and balanced, he ponders everything well, and passionately loves literature.

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Slovenia: NATO's Solana Holds News Conference

AU0105155196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has concluded his official visit to our country, which he paid at the invitation of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. Prior to his departure to Tirana, the last lag of his tour of East and Central European countries, Solana and his host held a news conference at the [Ljubljana] Brnik airport. Here is a report by Biserka Povse-Tasic:

[Begin recording] Prime Minister Drnovsek said that he and his old friend talked about general problems in the region, NATO expansion towards the East, and NATO relations with Russia. He also added that they did not encounter any difficulties in the talks.

[Drnovsek] I agreed with Mr. Solana that we should meet again at the end of May, when I will be in Brussels, as this will be an occasion to further intensify our relations.

[Povse-Tasic] In response to a journalist's question on the conditions that Slovenia must meet for NATO membership, these include the country's democracy and respect for rights and protection of minorities, as well as the extent to which Slovenia has met these conditions, as it has so far achieved enviable results in transition. Regarding the possibility of Slovenia becoming a NATO member in the first term, since the country was the first one to open individual talks, Solana replied in a convoluted diplomatic language:

[Solana in English fading into Slovene translation] Out of prudence, I would rather not answer that question. I would rather just say that 1996 is a very important stage in the process and that much still has to be done by the end of December. [end recording]

Slovenia: Solana Discusses Partnership for Peace

AU0105160196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited the Bohinjska Bela Barracks. At the meeting with the Defense Ministry delegation, the two sides discussed the implementation of the individual partnership program between Slovenia and NATO and the cooperation with our direct neighbors, NATO member states and members of the Partnership for Peace.

Defense Minister [Jelko] Kacin presented to Solana the comparative advantages that our country has in joining NATO, as well as the program of reorganization of the Slovene Army and its modernization adjusted to NATO standards.

The NATO secretary general was also interested in the question of democratic and civilian supervision over the Army. He also lauded the organization and work of the mountain school in Bohinjska Bela.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Sees 'No Need' To Host Nuclear Weapons

AU0105204996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Before his departure following a two-day official visit to our country, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana held a news conference at the Brnik Airport together with his host, Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. Among other things, Solana said that he did not agree with the assessment of former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, who told the Italian magazine PANORAMA that one of the crises in Europe may break out between Italy and Slovenia. In Solana's words, relations between Italy and Slovenia will undoubtedly be solved in the coming months, weeks, or days. Here is a report by Biserka Povse-Tasic:

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] As potential NATO members are ever more often facing the dilemma of whether out of solidarity they would have to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories, we asked Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek how Slovenia would react to such a possible demand.

[Drnovsek] We have not yet discussed that in Slovenia and that was not discussed at today's talks either. Up to this stage of our talks, NATO has not asked that question. Therefore, Slovenia still has no orientation on that. If this is needed in the future, it will certainly be decided not only by our government, but also by our parliament. However, as one can assess the situation in NATO and the current situation among the NATO powers themselves, I think that there will also be no need to deploy nuclear weapons on Slovene territory and that so far such a necessity has not been expressed. [end recording]

Slovenia: SKD's Personalities, Financial Lobbies

AU0205124496 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 24 Apr 96 pp 14-17

[Article by Janez Markes, former SLOVENEC columnist: "Peterle's Catch Is the Cash"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Five years after the formal leap into democracy, there is still no end in sight to the Slovene social transition, a characteristic of which is that one cannot see its beginnings either. It seems that the role of the Slovene transition boils down to the old political elite, which is in the domain of President Milan

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Kucan, restoring its former political strength, covering up its origins, and becoming pure, civic, and, above all, rich and financially secure.

There is no longer any doubt that the transition was planned by this lobby several years prior to the declaration of independence. It started with the internal party pluralism and continued with the explosion of nongovernmental organizations, which were taken over by the ruling ZSMS [Socialist Youth Union of Slovenia]. The first realistic threat emerged when the formation of political parties was allowed. However, the authorities of the time had to bite the bullet because such was the prevailing central European political logic dictated by the end of the Cold War. Even at the time, there were rumors that the old party *nomenklatura* was diverting enormous sums of money abroad, which were supposedly required for the subsequent secret financing of the political redistribution of the old elite. After approximately four years, the first information about Safti, Hit, Smelt, Cypriot companies, and various bypass companies leaked into the public. The crushing of Demos [the ruling coalition at the time] was possible and painless for several reasons.

Coexistence With the Past

It was relatively easy to play on the card of the incompetence of Demos's politicians, who had nowhere to learn the political know-how. The aforementioned lobby also had a well-placed security valve in at least one of the chambers of the tricameral parliament—the Chamber of Associated Labor. With its help, the lobby could block almost anything it wanted, so to speak. In operational terms, it was, therefore, not difficult to hold the reins at all. The main difficulty was (as it still is) how to create a convincing public image at home and abroad. After the second elections, what was at that time still an undivided lobby resolved this problem with the Christian Democrats. This marked the onset of a period of peace and coexistence among the politicians with incompatible pasts and, for the unsuspecting people, probably one of the most complex and, above all, the most unjust periods in the last few decades.

The key to the understanding of the logistics of the current transition thus lies in the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD]. The reason why the SKD is participating in this otherwise unsavory company lies in money, power, and the piece of pie of the refurbished and dubiously legal (and morally controversial) purged old elite. The SKD started building its empire rather modestly—with a healthy dose of enthusiasm, with a surplus of energy originating from the ghetto in which the Christians had lived before, and with the tacit support of the [Catholic] Church and the political groups from the period between the two world wars. One of the first financial supports came from Elan, when its financial director of the time, Pavel Koder, safeguarded 8,000 German marks [DM] for computers and accompanying equipment to them. This was probably the origin of Koder's legal problems, when he was accused of trivialities, while nobody sought to obtain explanations from him, which he should have provided by virtue of his post. At the time, the SKD was financed chiefly by people from abroad, however, in comparison to the present money flows, the sums involved were relatively small.

Sponsoring the Transition of the SKD

At the very beginning, the sponsors were the affiliated companies: SCT from Munich (DM150,000 supposedly came from it for the last elections), Gorenje Munich (more than DM200,000 so far), and Petrol. The mediator between the German Gorenje and the SKD was supposedly a former Elan employee, Mrs. Ovsenik. The SKD's financial position began to improve dramatically when the party became a strategic partner in Drnovsek's government as well as in Kucan's transitional headquarters. Earlier, the SKD was the butt of their derision, a target for the contemptuous remarks of the ZSMS and the [former Communist] party, a deplorable bunch of retrograde clerico-fascists [klerofasisti].

The Christian Democrats slipped into their role quickly and readily. It seems that they learned cynicism from their new friends; believing that this was politics, they adopted the uncritical Pan-European internationalism that replaced the logic of the ghetto and, finally, they started thinking about the economic initiative, about the division of the national financial pie. On the other hand, this was the price that the old elite had to pay, the price that would, in any case, be paid by the taxpayers and workers.

SKD's Financial Lobby

A lobby in the true sense of the word only emerged during Drnovsek's second term of office. Its emergence coincided with the start of privatization, which represented the second phase of transition. After Peter Reberc, the party organization was assumed by Edvard Stanic, who, in terms of the program, tried very hard to make the party more pragmatic. The influence of the so-called patriotic Slovene capital in the party, which saw the undisputed sublimation of all interests that had been repressed for decades in the Christian Democracy, started to wane at the time. An essential component of this investment scheme was also the new daily SLOVENEC, which was supposed to become the main Slovene daily to address Slovenia from the democratic

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principles. For the first owners of this paper, the main principles of democracy were a modernized Christian (political) ethos and the continuation of the tradition of the former SLOVENEC. The paper was doubtlessly intended, as it transpired later, to provide logistical support for the new Christian Democratic policy and not to function as an organism in itself with its own internal logic.

Man From the Background

The managerial board of SLOVENEC at the time actually represented an intersection of the roots of the SKD's financial lobby, while the paper's assembly represented a cross section of its ideological background. Later on, this image mutated considerably, according to the financial investments. Litostroj's director, Dr. Joze Duhovnik, currently the party's first potential large-scale capitalist, was the president of the paper's managerial board for many years. Initially, Dr. Joze Bernik, current president of the Slovene World Congress from Chicago, was the president of the paper's assembly, however, he was soon replaced in the name of the church by the cooperative Dr. Janez Gril. Namely, the financial picture started to elude the original concept as the paper suffered terrible losses, which grew (and continue to grow) to between DM150,000 and DM300,000 per month.

The main man in the background, who most often secured all this money, was Izidor Rejc, who built an identical, parallel financial empire (we assume also with the identical objectives) in the SKD itself. He formalized his political power a little over two years ago and replaced Duhovnik in SLOVENEC, while he has been the president of the party council, which, on the basis of a regional key, was comprised of a few more than 35 people, throughout. The party considers him to be a mysterious, lonely rider who is unpredictable, harmless, artistically poetic, and naive.

Rejc, of course, is anything but this. He makes up the most influential party lobby. Through Janez Obreza and Marija Strbenc, he almost slavishly and completely subordinated SLOVENEC to himself, turning it into his mouthpiece, so to speak. No politician featured on the front pages of SLOVENEC as often as he did. He can afford to be the main subject of the house's editorial columns. He must be portrayed as a poet, a writer, a politician, almost as a Mother Teresa. His power is absolute and is linked to a mysterious lobby. Namely, Rejc's financial base and team do not come from within the party, but from outside it. The whole story is rather mysterious, however, we hold reliable information on the ways in which he obtained the money for SLOVENEC from various companies. LEK, whose director used to be Metod Dragonja, present minister of economic activity, paid about 20 million tolars to the paper. We have learned from within the well-informed circles at the time that this money was closely linked to the fact that Rejc was the president of the parliamentary commission for the supervision of the property transformation of companies, which was in possession of a lot of information. In view of this, companies would very quickly get what one may call pangs of conscience.

Convents and Associations

On the other hand, there are also companies linked to Izidor Rejc that are in a strange way cooperative of their own accord, although they have no direct interests in SLOVENEC or the SKD. These are the companies enjoying a monopolistic or semimonopolistic status, such as Petrol, Triglav Insurance, HIT, SCT, and numerous small enterprises that contributed as much as DM100,000. Very large sums of money are being transferred from industry to SLOVENEC, for which nobody knows what is their subsequent fate, what is the percentage that Rejc gets for his services, and what the party, director Obreza, and those involved in it get.

The lobby from which the money poured into Rejc's realm can, through names, be linked to the lobby of President Kucan. Many emphasize that it is impossible that the companies loyal to Kucan would support his enemies—one usually supports friends. A rumor started circulating in well-informed circles lately about the frequent and good connections between Rejc and Kucan. There is talk of an elite association to which they both belong. Some speak of the Covenant of St. Urban, a sort of wine association, others mention other similar associations to which Rejc supposedly belongs and which supposedly discuss the strategy of the division of funds and the goals that they would accomplish with them. The accuracy of all this is questionable, however, the fact remains that Izidor Rejc is the co-owner of Hram [authorized investment fund] (a stockholder is Dr. Joze Duhovnik), which became a competitor to Krek's Society within the Christian Democratic domain, however, the latter won the battle.

What is most controversial from the point of democracy is that Rejc holds all the necessary insider information as the president of the property commission, which leaves wide possibilities open.

Umek-Dezelak Lobby

If the era of emigre support was followed by the era of Izidor Rejc and, we could also say, Kucan's lobby, which destroyed and purged SLOVENEC and subjugated the party to the donor logic and the policy of small jobs for small people, then the next lobby to come

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ensured "Drnovsek's presence." This story started with Secretary General Edvard Stanic, who initially gave the impression of favoring European pragmatism and the professionalization of the party. The end of his era is as complicated as the beginning. He simply vanished from the political scene and left conflicting interpretations behind him. Some said he had nothing to eat and others that he was rolling in money. He was in power at a precarious time of the creation of the coalition—for which he holds considerable merit, as well as for the appointment of [Transportation] Minister Igor Umek, Peterle's former boss.

Within this circle emerged the road lobby, which was completely independent from the [SKD] party policy and which some went as far as to be called an LDS faction. Apart from Umek, the circle also comprised of Marjan Dvornik, Marjan Novak, Edvard Stanic, and Vida Cadonic Spelic. Their positions were rather strong because, because of the roads (Franci Slak, Joze Brodnik), they managed huge sums of money. However, just as was the case with Rejc, nothing in the Ministry of Transport and Communications happens without the supervision of the LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia]; be it roads, the telephone system, or the postal services. The advantage of Rejc was that he always played on the card of populism. He sympatized with the people's faction and tried to subordinate the media to himself. Umek's clan operates in an elitist manner. Actually, it does not have the real support of the party and its electorate, but the party can (no longer) function without him.

What is also very interesting is the role of Minister Janko Dezelak [minister of economic relations and development]. Many believe him to be a soft and an emotional man who sings nicely and would not harm a fly. He is, perhaps, representative of the entire party. When the SKD negotiated on the new ministerial posts with the LDS, the latter agreed to barter on condition that Dezelak would be appointed as minister but could not change the ministry's cadre structure or replace state secretaries. Just as in the bank before, Dezelak uncritically signed many decisions in the Ministry of Transport—the final responsibility will, naturally, lie with him and the party, but, in reality, the ministry is headed by Drnovsek's cadre.

Conflict

The Umek-Dezelak and Rejc factions clashed in the economic forum, headed by Dr. Ljubo Sirc. The forum also has its executive committee. Its president was Igor Umek, but he resigned and his post was taken by Marjan Knez. The forum gives the impression of emancipating itself from the party. With its financial muscle, it participates in the media projects that used to be in Rejc's domain. Matej Kovac, the forum's former leading member, for example, is a member of SLOVENEC's grievance commission, where, together with Dr. Janez Gril, who is the ideological and the managerial alter ego of Izidor Rejc, he is making sure that all cadre purges are carried out to the end. The entire forum is now a shareholder in the TV3 television house. It appears that the task of the LDS lobby is to neutralize Krek Bank and its "spring" media strategy in the media.

The times have changed for Izidor Rejc also regarding the selection of candidates for the next elections, as he was left out in the first round of candidacies. Supposedly, he was included on the list in the second round. For the time being, Rejc still holds the party council firmly in his hands, however, the question is how much longer he can survive, especially because the circle around his financial transactions is tightening. On the other hand, the party knows that he tried to seize power on the occassion of the election of the party secretary general, when he favored Janez Obreza, however, Vida Cadonic Spelic won by a majority of one.

The Role in Transition

The SKD, as it seems, built its financial empire by moving in the proximity of a clearly defined pool of capital. There is only a step from here to the conclusion that this is not completely separate from the issue of transition and the reestablishment of the old elites. Party President Lojze Peterle, whom many reproached for a negative cadre selection to consolidate his status in the party, maintains his undisputed role of political leader. It seems, however, that, in the game of several financial lobbies where swords are crossing similarly to the manner in which Kucan and Drnovsek are dividing their spheres of influence, Peterle is the purest. It also appears that he is distancing himself from most information in order to be able to be pure, while, on the other hand, it appears that the party voters, as a result of historic and social experiences, still believe in a party whose name is based on its system of values. In the interest of the above transition, the SKD is supposed to inaugurate the first large-scale capitalist, Dr. Joze Duhovnik, who is expected to privatize the Socialist mastodon named Litostroj. Once the property transformation is completed, the old elite will no longer need the SKD. The protagonists and members of the lobbies, bent over the voters "with soft hearts and pure intentions," will also no longer need the old elite. They will be the new elite then. From the social surplus, they will tell people that, by great sacrifices, they won them what they wanted—democracy—and that one must also sacrifice something for it.

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Federal

FRY: Qian Qichen Says China Supports Belgrade's Policy

LD3004150996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1359 GMT 30 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beijing, April 30 (TANJUG)—China will advocate a lifting of all sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its speedy reintegration into all international organizations and institutions, Chinese Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said during a meeting with Yugoslav Ambassador in Beijing Slobodan Unkovic.

Qichen hailed the peaceful policy pursued by Yugoslavia and its leadership in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

When Yugoslavia was facing its greatest difficulties, President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic focused on resolving crucial issues and worked for peace, said Qichen, who visited Belgrade in April 1995.

Qichen reiterated the stand of the Chinese leadership that Serbia and Milosevic had a crucial role in resolving problems in Bosnia and establishing peace in the Balkans, adding that the policy was now being recognized by Western countries.

He said that cooperation among all former Yugoslav republics was an important factor for a return of peace in the region.

Qichen and Unkovic agreed that there was a disparity in the good political relations between the two countries and their economic cooperation, which they said, was developed below its possibilities.

Qichen underscored that his country's leadership favoured the promotion of economic, trade, scientific and cultural cooperation between the two countries and spoke highly of a visit by Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic to China in December. He expressed the conviction that the visit would greatly contribute to a further expansion of bilateral cooperation.

Unkovic thanked China for its principled stand in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and reiterated Yugoslavia's position that Taiwan was an integral part of China.

He also informed Qichen that Milosevic had accepted an invitation to visit China. The date of the visit has yet to be determined.

The Yugoslav ambassador conveyed an invitation to Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Chinese Premier Li Peng by their Yugoslav counterparts Lilic and Radoje Kontic, respectively, to visit Yugoslavia.

FRY: Minister Cited on New Laws To Improve Economy

LD2904131396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1140 GMT 29 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 29 (TANJUG)—Ownership transformation and foreign investment laws that are to be adopted by the Yugoslav parliament at its May session will contribute to the improvement of the Yugoslav economic environment and business conditions, Yugoslav Minister Tomica Raicevic said.

Under the bill on ownership changes the capital of all firms (social, state or cooperative) is to be assessed according to a methodology unified for the entire country that will be determined by the Yugoslav Finance Ministry, Raicevic said at TANJUG's panel discussion.

Firms will be given a 12-month period to complete the assessment of their capital, and if they do not finish the job within that time it will be done by the state agency for assessment of capital within 90 days, Raicevic said.

'The final decision on privatisation is made by administrative bodies of a firm—the council of workers, assembly, administrative board—and not by the director,' Raicevic said.

He emphasised the importance of the adoption of the foreign investments law which extends the possibility of participation of foreign capital to practically all activities, except the military, and allows for foreign firms to have a majority stake.

Speaking about economic trends at the beginning of the year he said that industrial output in the first three months went up by 3.6 per cent in relation to the same period last year, banks had increased their solvency thanks to the measures of the Yugoslav National Bank and the dinar's foreign exchange rate has maintained its stability.

Raicevic said the state now controlled some 19 percent of the imports, to protect domestic production, and only 2.6 percent of the exports of mostly agricultural products.

He said that foreign trade went up by 12.1 percent in the first quarter of this year in relation to the same period last year but that this was mostly the result of 27 percent increase of imports while exports were down by 9.3 percent.

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Speaking about the normalisation of relations with the International Monetary Fund, he said that positive steps had been made in talks so far but the job is neither easy nor simple and is not of a purely economic but also of a political nature.

'Due to the seriousness of the job and importance of the normalisation of our relations with the IMF and the World Bank the Yugoslav Government assessed it was necessary to raise the talks to a higher level,' he said adding talks would be coordinated by Deputy Finance Minister Jovan Zebic in cooperation with the National Bank of Yugoslavia and other ministries.

Stressing the need of foreign investments for boosting the country's economic activity, Raicevic said that besides regulation of relations with the international financial institutions foreign funds can be obtained through partnerships between Yugoslav and foreign firms.

FRY: Government Submits Economic Bills to Parliament

LD2904162396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1535 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 29 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government on Monday submitted to the Yugoslav parliament a bill on the ownership transformation of socially-owned capital and a bill on enterprises, which should create conditions for the transformation and more efficient operation of the Yugoslav economy.

The bill on the ownership transformation of socially-owned capital is based on the obligation of assessing the value and structure of a company's capital and its independence in reaching a decision on the ownership transformation process.

Under the bill, each firm has to assess the value of capital (socially-owned, state-owned or cooperative) under a single method for the entire country.

Firms will have a 12-month deadline to assess the value of capital. If they fail, a state agency would do so within 90 days from the expiry of the deadline.

Under the bill, socially-owned capital can be transformed through a number of models or their combinations and this is to be decided by the firm itself.

Socially-owned capital can be transformed by selling the firm's shares in order to sell capital or increase the firm's capital, by transferring shares to funds, and by turning investments and claims into permanent deposit.

The government said that the ownership transformation has been going on in Yugoslavia for about five years and that about 70 percent of state companies in serbia and about 90 percent in Montenegro have undergone this change.

The dominant model of the sale of state-owned capital has been the so-called model of workers' shareholding.

The government submitted to parliament a bill on enterprises, which defines enterprises and enterpreneurs, establishes the forms of enterprises, ways of their founding, activities, seats, property, organs and employees.

Under the bill, enterprises can take the form of a business association, economic enterprise and public enterprise.

A business association is formed either as an association of persons or as an association of capital (company, corporation).

An association of persons will be formed as a partnership association or a commandite partnership association. An association of capital will be formed as a joint-stock company or a limited liability company.

Serbia

Serbia: Seselj Says U.S. Complicates Brcko Situation

LD0205150896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1310 GMT 2 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 2 May (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], said today that the Brcko situation is being complicated because "the United States is rapidly seeking a formula by which it would be given to the Muslims."

"The Serbs should not give up Brcko and should not permit any entry of Muslims into the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, because there is a danger that the state could be divided at this town," Seselj said at a news conference in Belgrade.

According to him, the frequent provocations on the borders of the Serb Republic are part of U.S. strategy and are taking place in coordination with the United States.

Serbia: 'Manipulations' in Bosnian Elections Predicted

AU0205072296 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 4

[Commentary by M. Dragovic: "The Dead Will Come to Life?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The rules published by the Provisional Election Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina,

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which were presented to the public by Robert Frowick, caused tumultuous reactions and doubts in all three—until recently—warring factions in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The first response came from Kasim Begic, the representative of the Muslim leadership from Sarajevo, who claimed that "Frowick's ruling on an exception from the general regulation would become the rule in election activities, thus making the results of ethnic cleansing official."

The Muslims are not happy that there is the possibility of an "exception"—that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who lived there until 6 April 1992 and then changed their places of residence, either by their own will or because of the war, will have the right to register and vote in the communes in which they live at present. According to the proclaimed rules mentioned above, these citizens will have the opportunity to vote in these places personally, not in absentia.

What Does Alija Need the Elections For?

The Croats and the Serbs have a further reason for fear, at least regarding the elections. In several meetings held last and this week in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Bihac, Alija Izetbegovic openly stated that the "struggle will go on until Bosnia's territory is united and the country is democratic." Will there be elections at all? This question is being asked by both the Serbs and the Croats, since if someone like Izetbegovic constantly calls for a war, what does he need elections for?

An important factor regarding with the forthcoming elections is to define the number of voters. The Muslim side constantly cites the number of 200,000 dead Muslims. The Western press occasionally points to that propaganda trick, since it considers this number unrealistically high. It is probable that "the dead and the killed" will not remain "within the 200,000 limit" for long, since many will appear on election lists in order to be able to vote. It is probable that there will be no observers from the other two nations in Muslim regions, so that there will be no true control of the voters and lists.

Since the refugees who presently live abroad are also allowed to vote, there will certainly be many irregularities, because the Serb Republic has no diplomatic offices in the world, so that the refugees will vote in the embassies of the Muslim leadership from Sarajevo. The results of this vote are already known! The Croats from Herceg-Bosna will be confronted with a similar problem, since almost predominantly Muslims are employed by Izetbegovic's "embassies of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Bitter Experience

Brcko will have a special position in the election, since the demarcation line around this town will be defined by arbitration. A part of this municipality is now populated by Muslims, and the other part by Serbs. If the arbitration is not completed by the time of the elections, which can hardly be assumed, the question arises of who has sovereignty over the municipality. Large-scale manipulations are possible, for the simple reason that a large number of Muslims from neighboring municipalities will be entered on lists as refugees in the Muslim municipality of Brcko, with residence in Maoca. This phenomenon has already been seen; in the first multiparty elections in 1991, the Croats from western Herzegovina voted in this way in Mostar and won the communal rule for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], although they did not have a majority in that town. The results of the vote in Maoca could make the international community split the Serb Republic into two parts in the arbitration.

The forthcoming elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina could easily turn into everything else but a democratic and regular vote of recent enemies, but this is the reality in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia: 'Clashes' Among Serbs in FRY, B-H, Croatia

AU0205075996 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 12

[Commentary by Radivoje Petrovic: "To Our Own Disadvantage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the military tensions in the vicinity of Serbia ceased, the Serbian national and political space has again become the scene of general neurosis, which shows that we are our own greatest, the masters of all kinds of activities to our own disadvantage.

One can see that both the basic national and daily political issues appear and are occasionally resolved with too much improvisation and exaggerated politicization, with effects that confirm the absence of wisdom that has proved extremely dangerous in the past. Since our own recent or earlier history has not taught us a lesson, we are afforded the luxury of comfortable behavior for which small nations like ours pay a high price.

This kind of political diagnosis has been confirmed by several events during the last couple of weeks, the most prominent of which are the silent emigration from the Srem and Baranja region and the first street clash between the Socialists and the opposition. The most acute issue regarding the national survival of the Serbs

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on the territory of the former Yugoslavia was revealed in the last few months on the example of the Serbian region of Srem and Baranja. Moveable property is taken from that region to Serbia every night. Although this is not happening on a large scale, it is still worrying. The efforts of international mediators, the verbal activity of local leaders, and the insufficient guarantees for the local Serbs are facing the understandable mistrust of a large part of the population and the thesis that coexistence is not possible. Whether we want to admit it or not, this enables the aggressive Croatian propaganda to become active, and it supports the idea of a Croatia without Serbs, with the motto launched by Zagreb about the peaceful reintegration of "the Croatian Danube region."

No one who is informed about the problems of the Serbs in Srem, Baranja, and Slavonia can blame the ordinary people for this development. Every benevolent person has to ask himself what has been done and what is being done in order to stop the nightly movements. It is certain that the present situation is to the advantage of the all those who support the thesis that the people should remain in their homes: The national structure in the region of Srem and Baranja is predominantly Serbian, and there is no room for immigration and a change of the national structure; a new local administration has just been constituted, whose representatives should become active among the population; the model for the international police force includes foreigners, Serbs, and Croats as those who shall supervise the life and work of the people....

What has happened to the irreconcilable Serbian character, which has been stressed so often, if the territory is being voluntarily abandoned and everything that the people went through during the war operations is being forgotten? Why don't the political leaders confront the mistrust of the people toward the new conditions of life by explaining and showing by their own example that life will be possible after "the peaceful reintegration"?

Comparing the recent event in Doboj with the events in the region of Srem and Baranja, the conclusion is clear. Several days ago, several hundred Muslims tried to return to Doboj, which became part of the Serb territory, provoking conflicts and showing that there was a precisely calculated policy by the Muslim leadership behind what seemed to be spontaneous collective behavior. Whereas they are trying to return to the regions that no longer belong to them, the Serbs from Srem and Baranja are leaving their homes, thus making the reintegration task easy for Croatia. It is only natural that, on this occasion, stories are told about false policies, about dilemmas that have consciously been stressed, and about whether people will be sacrificed or not if they stay here, but it is a fact that the final consequence is dangerous, and that our contribution to it is immeasurable.

A similar statement can be made after the street conflict between the followers of the opposition and those of the Socialists in Novi Sad last week. Political passions defeated political wisdom, and it was pure luck that something that could become part of our political life if this kind of political thinking continues could be prevented.

An even higher level of political passion is expressed in political clashes in the Serb Republic between the Socialists and the ruling SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. The prohibition or undermining of Socialist Party political meetings increases tensions within the Serb Republic and shows that the Serbs will wage wars among themselves if there is no other enemy. If there is no tolerance and wisdom, then there are clashes and neurosis!

There are enough examples in our everyday environment that carry these or similar messages. What they all have in common is that the final goal is not realized because of stubborn insistence on one's own political positions. No one realizes that the final check for everything will be paid by the ordinary people. It is, therefore, necessary to begin with political moderation. We must bear in mind all the time that we should not make anything that will increase the neurosis, disorder, and chaos that could harm our national and political interests.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Bulatovic Urges Compromise in Bank Dispute

AU0205104396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Compromise With Governor Necessary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, who is on a two-day visit to Great Britain, said to a BETA reporter that he had not discussed with his hosts "Montenegro's views on the program of Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic."

"It is really not necessary, and does our country's reputation no good, to have the governor committed to one solution and the federal government to another," Bulatovic said, adding that "a compromise has to be found in line with reality. That is not hard and we are only a small step away from that unity."

Bulatovic said that "the condition for international financial aid to the FRY is the normalization of relations

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with the World Bank and the IMF," and that "there will be no significant credits until the issue of the monetary and economic legitimacy of the FRY is resolved."

Asked by a POBJEDA reporter what kind of a reaction he expected from Belgrade to his visit to London, Bulatovic said that he expected "a positive reaction, since the visit was largely arranged with the help of the FRY Embassy."

Montenegro: Serb Media's Stance Toward Republic Explored

AU0205103196 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 1 May 96 p 7

[Article by Djoko Kesic: "Mile Djukanovic's Resignation Is a Provocation Launched by Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sensational news item published in the Belgrade press, according to which Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic has already drafted his resignation and will soon be leaving the important state post to become an entrepreneur, is a complete fabrication, a calculated provocation launched by certain Belgrade political circles, our reliable source in the Monetenegrin leadership has informed us.

In actuality, this is calculated and base political subversion, psychological pressure on the Montenegrin leadership and public, and at the same time a very dangerous pressure on the unity of the Yugoslav federation. The news caused great revolt and bitterness in Montenegro. We know which political circles in Belgrade are fabricating such information. However, we do not understand how the Belgrade and Serbian public fail to grasp the extent of the damage that such and similar political provocation can cause.

TELEGRAF's reliable source in Montenegro said that it was clear where the crucial problem between the two federal units lies. It concerns the concept and approach to privatization and property relations, which means different concepts of state organization. However, despite the fact that the differences are substantial—the Montenegrin ruling party believes that the most rational thing to do is to go for total privatization, while the Serb Socialists hold a different view—this does not mean that the two federal units must engage in a conflict, that one leadership needs to be replaced in order for views and commitments to change. Therefore, despite all the differences, our collocutor claims that a political agreement is possible, the primary objective of which would be to agree on a successful development concept for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and maintain the unity of Serbia and Montenegro, which throughout history has never come into question. This brings us to another important issue: Which politician or political party would be ready to shoulder the political burden and responsibility, and venture to break up and divide Serbia and Montenegro?

Our source claims that false information along the lines of that about Prime Minister Djukanovic's resignation is calculated to cause a rift between Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. Belgrade political circles are perhaps unaware that Bulatovic and Djukanovic have not made a single move, particularly one that is important for both Montenegro and the Yugoslav federation, without consulting each other and a wide circle of advisers. President Bulatovic and Prime Minister Djukanovic are close friends, and in state affairs they share a high degree of mutual trust.

Our source placed the information regarding Prime Minster Djukanovic's alleged resignation in a general media context.

The Montenegrin authorities are extremely concerned over the way the Belgrade media treats the activities of Montenegrin leaders. Radio Television Serbia no longer broadcasts the Montenegrin Television newscast. It supposedly does not fit in with their program scheme. While this "scheme" still functioned, the RTS often broadcast some third-rate sports event in place of our newscast. Prime Minister Djukanovic's visit to the United States was extremely successful. He was even received by the head of the National Security Council. Djukanovic agreed to several significant business deals, and secured a loan for important investments in Montenegro, which is the first such thing since the introduction of sanctions. The visit thawed the otherwise extremely tense relations between the United States and the FRY. Belgrade media, however, failed to publish a single word on the subject. That is disgraceful! On the other hand, two criminals were killed in Montenegro recently. High-profile Belgrade papers devoted a lot of coverage to the case. Are these good intentions? It is unclear why such things are done....

Our collocutor mentioned the latest such example:

On 29 April, President Bulatovic left on an official visit to Great Britain. Why did the Belgrade media fail to adequately cover his departure and visit? He set off on a state visit, and he certainly did not represent only Montenegro's, but also the FRY's interests....

Why is the Belgrade media doing this? Who is chasing whom from the federation in this way?

The Montenegrin leadership and people do not wish to separate from Yugoslavia, and we expect the Serbian and federal authorities to answer these questions. These

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relations are reminiscent of recent history in the Yugoslav region. Or perhaps the Serbian media are intentionally adding grist to Slavko Perovic's (Montenegrin Liberal Party head) mill and his already known political orientation, which for the time being does not have many supporters, our source in the Montenegrin state leadership concluded.

Kosovo

Kosovo: UN's Rehn To Examine Human Rights Situation

AU0205154396 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 2 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Elisabeth Rehn, special UN rapporteur on human rights, has arrived in Kosova to examine the human rights situation. In a short statement, she said that she plans to visit Sanxhak [Sandzak] after Kosova. Her next visit will include Vojvodina and Slovenia.

Mrs. Rehn will be in Kosova for two days. She is scheduled to meet with the leader of Albanians in Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, and the chairman of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, Adem Demaci, today. On the second day, Mrs. Rehn will hold talks with representatives of the local Serbian authorities.

This is the second time that Mrs. Rehn has visited Kosova. Her visit coincides with the grave situation in Kosova following the latest killings, which have been very frequent and have saddened various international diplomatic circles.

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